A typical example of what makes theory unformalizable is the horizontal relation between epistemorphization and the diegesis.
It’s neither the case that both the truth and the untruth can be rendered apparent; nor that rendition-to-the-apparent (literally: e-vidence) reveals truth. In the rigorous language of Rudolf Willie’s “Formal Concept Analysis”, this structure of horizontal relation is termed “orthogonality”. In this way (and at least for this special problem of truth/experience — an important one) the unformalizeability of theory can be formalized.
Ça veut dire: any formalization of theory is forced to “break ties” at horizontal/orthogonal relations. This matches the subjective experience of mathematical training, where one learns to produce proofs by tie-breaking between equally valid derivation subtrees. It also neatly characterizes just what’s the “petty bourgeois” step we refuse to do.
The epistemorphization of theory is about as unavoidable, useful and in-the-limit misleading as the anthropomorphization of technology.
The anthropomorphic quality of technology depends on technical and market factors. Maybe the mouse pointer is only inadvertently phallic, but voice assistants (Siri, Cortana, etc) are all made to simulate the requisite physique du role.
This is also true of the epistemorphic quality of theory. It often sounds like French philosophy because it has French philosophy in its carburetor. But it can strategically come in shapes, flavors and colors. Indeed, the radical and mundane import of chroma is that it suggests, by showing that theory consists of conjuring chromaticities, that it must have consequences in the domain of the chrema as well. In other words: chroma fiddles with the frame of theory; it renders intelligible elements that are not directly in the picture at any given moment.