We have never been asemic 3: harder

I have less time today, but want to leave a couple of notes anyway.

“Asemic writing” refers to a genre of writing. English is overly flat here; On grammatology offers the syn-chromic term écriture which serves us much better. Asemic writing blazes past the boundaries of what Grammatology terms “logocentrism”. It does so not for moral reasons — not because they’ve found Grammatology to be persuasive, let alone epochal — but with ethical purpose. There’s something true about the idea of logocentrism, particularly if qualified (as Derrida himself repeatedly does) as an essentially moral concept, almost everywhere devoid of ethical implications. Asemic writing is itself the ethical project, and needs no prior moralization to stand. This is meant very literally: whether volumes of asemic writing find economic and physical standing on my bookshelves is quite independent from whether Grammatology has any standing. Indeed, the word asemic may be the singular chromic stand it takes: no, it’s not in opposition to anything “semic”, it’s… that which you see in the works of Tim Gaze and Rosaire Appel.

Muddled as it is (with a quality that seems to begar the attention of a world-class literary editor to really shine), On Grammatology still manages to sound prescient, if only because it appears to develop its polemic of the écriture while still unaware of both asemic writing and computer code. Each of these escapes the circle of “logocentrism” by purely chrematistical means; if any new chromaticity comes out of computer languages, this happens at a higher level of abstraction. That this higher level of abstraction is identifiable with a “higher axiology” in some consistent higher/lower or larger/smaller gradation of axiologies is one of the chromaticity shifts I hope to eventually induce through these writings.

Then: theory may as well be a “praxis of intelligibility”, but asemic writing and computer code are both leaps into the unintelligible. You’re not supposed to understand computer code at first glance; an experienced software developer will be able to identify major structural features (and this with the help of automatic multicolor annotation and 2D indentation conventions), but if it was at all possible to “reason about a program in your head”, as demanded by the Dijkstra doctrine, you wouldn’t need the chrema of computers (even if you did use them as conveniency devices). I claim — and this is admittedly a vatic proclamation rather than a theorem — that theory similarly needs to work at the frontier of intelligibility but remain outside of the reach of casual-glance understanding. There are no shortcuts; every time I’ve tried to use clickbaity polemical matter as models, I’ve made strategic mistakes in the longer-run scheme of things.

This short text may as well be our n-th “gente introduction to asemic horizon”: hi, this is theory, and ideally it should make you perplex enough that your nose bleeds. I’m acutely aware of our failures in this respect. But as GPT-2 once said, after munging my écritures, we have no choice but to become stronger stronger stronger and do all the other things.

I hope I’ve managed at least to induce a mild headache here.

We have never been asemic 2: chroma

The question that’s prior to all philosophy is the distinction between ethics and morality. The corresponding technical issue for theory is the distinction between chromaticity and chrematistics.

The word “chromaticity” is meant to evoke, on the one level, the “chromatic aberration” view of anomaly previously put forward. Photographic lenses and sensors exhibit chromatic aberrations when they produce color shifts and component breakdowns that are absent in the naïve view of scenes. But it’s also a small step toward a discussion of freedom: notwithstanding the (moral) techniques and theories of painting, an artist is still faced with mixing his colors, teasing out a palette from the tubes of oil paint available to him. It’s also, of course, gloriously alliterative with “chrematistics”.

Maybe more importantly, this new term lets us break the false symmetry of “left and right half-axiologies”, in retrospect a fundamental betrayal of the ethical concerns that animate asemic horizon.

Chrematistics, as so often discussed before, is an ancient Greek work referring to the art of acquiring great wealth. In the generic theory setting of asemic horizon, its meaning has been unfolded, spread out: chrematistics points to the theory of achievement, particularly insofar achieving certain things (great wealth, yes, but also seducing women, intellectual insight, action in the face of extreme uncertainty) relates to the edifice of singular-only Theory.

We should unpack th is a little. The implicit formal correspondence in this text’s first paragraph is not really [ethics : chromaticity :: morality : chrematistics], but its adjoint [ethics : morality :: chromaticity chrematistics]. I claim, out of wide-eyed speculative theory-making, that an adjunction actually exists; that the first correspondence can be obtained from the first. Good bad news: the necessary “adjunction theorem” cannot be proven systematically, but only shown to resonate in the whirlwind of concerns that animates actual life, the actual domain of chrematistics. After all, if we’re unable of unwilling to pin “ethics” down like a butterfly, how would we account for chromaticity (in some intuitive analogy, the lens that produces anomalies) in its genericmost sense?

Being it that the quadruple object of ethics-morality-chromaticity-chrematistics is so distant from our cognitive and moral reach, we need — most of the time — to be content with projections — like the shadows 3D objects project on 2D surfaces. One such projection — but not even the sole projection that touches these terms — relates freedom to causality. The proper moral (eliminativist) view has long been converging towards a mechanistic view of the universe that, despite its proper philosophical merits and its chrema worth, raises vexing ethical questions regarding novelty, creativity, intentionality, unpredictability. And this isn’t just a chroma issue: the notion that the planet is spherical has little chrema value to the proverbial 16th century seafaring enterprise — given that it still has no notion of longitude.

Longitude (generically, the missing and unknown wealth of worthy knowledge) goes a long way to show just how enmeshed chroma/chrema issues can be. The chrema view of this affair (from a higher axiology; it’s all too easy to 21th-century quarterback if this can’t be kept in mind) is that knowledge of the mechanistic gearwork of the universe dissolves this problem; that ontology is autonomous from epistemology, that the limits of our cognitive reach are not the limits of a morally correct understanding of the universe. But then this is a morality empty of chrematistic value. Only the chroma (exchanging space with time, resetting the clock every noon so the drift in chronology tells you something about the drift in longitude space) unlocks chrema in this scenario.

This suggests that there’s a road to General Axiology, it needs to proceed from the glitch to anomaly to chromaticity. Something is lost from the vague eschatological narrative of a descent into genericity that will flip, at the critical moment, into full generality, but something is also saved: the increasing irrelevance of increasing genericity — the core anomaly of the road to General Axiology — now explodes in possible colors as we look seriously into theory itself. True impasses are always resolved by true glitches.

We have never been asemic

The basic question in philosophy is the distinction between ethics and morality.

As kids, we all pick up from the environment what is done and what is not; this encompasses not only issues of morality and ethics, but also etiquette, grammar and aesthetic notions. Sometimes, a distilled “moral code” is explicitly pressed upon us, but only as a failsafe: no one — not even people who believe in trolley problems as an instrument of inquiry — really believes the morality within the cognitive reach of a child is really sufficient to take stock of the world, as subtle, contradictory and indefinitely rich in details as it presents itself.

But now we are adults; this means we have, in principle, a wealth of philosophical traditions, well within our adult cognitive reach, that shed light on the basic distinction between ethics and morality. We get lost along the way (and I don’t mean “because we don’t study philosophy”; practical life makes us develop naïve or ad-hoc philosophies of this and that). We get either drunk on epistemology — the theory of knowledge, or rather the theory of theories-of-knowledge that can become knowledge-of-knowledge — or ontology — the theory of reality.

The Good News of General Axiology is that these problems, in their innumerable specific real variations, ultimately flow from the distinction between ethics and morality. The Better News of General Axiology is that theory of a more genericized kind touches all sorts of specific real problems — what to do about incels, how to think about politics, how to make sense of this and that incoming disaster.

The Bad News is that we have, at best, a series of literary resonances evoking an overall effect that General Axiology is more than mere ansatz. From the beginning we’ve made up various kinds of technical concepts aiming at the basic distinction (e.g. left and half axiologies, tempo and kairos, etc.). But we’ve also blurred things quite a bit. This blurring reflects the fact that much of the ongoing anomaly is due to chromatic aberrations that produce bleeding-over effects. This was the core of Jairwave: Bolsonaro is a purely moral political affair, but it produces ethical ghost-trails.

Maybe the basic distinction can never be mastered, only obliquely approached. Every interesting real situation will present itself in blurred, paradoxical form, and the task at hand will be to tease out a chromaticity that maximizes the evidence of anomalies. If asemic horizon believes itself to be interesting, it will also need to be shaken and probed for its own latent anomalies, most pressingly the fact that it presents itself in the form that it does — a blog, largely concerned about itself, persisting only on pain of making up words.

Let this, at least, be a razor test: never trust any system of thought that identifies ethics with morality. Novelty, causality, knowledge, freedom, death and symbolic calculus are all mutually and simultaneously determined in such a way that conflating ethics with morality is either lazy thinking or purposeful, sustained error.

Above all: never trust a man who will call himself an “ethicist”.

Condition

(scherzo)

Have you ever noticed that laughter and fear are basically the same? (Up to, or modulo something that has the discursive structure of an ambit, at least.)

This idea came to me as a counterintuitive reversal of what’s implied in the actual dynamics of these processes; but as it turns out (you can research this yourself, the referencespace is huge) the physiology bears what earlier on was a radical hypothesis — a false concept on whose marrow to suck. So this raises a follow-up question: if the physiology of laughter and fear is roughly comparable, what’s the quotient here? To spell out unusual terminology: in the phrase “laughter and fear are the same modulo X”, what’s X?

The beautiful theory of algebraic topology, quickly shaping into one humanity’s great achievements, is concerned with the classification of spacelike objects (here I’m glossing over with great violence the meaning of “topology”) up to X. What’s ultimately desired is to classify objects up to homotopy. Homotopy equivalence between two objects means that a continuously-varying family of intermediate objects can be found: in the following picture, we can imagine a continuous thickening of shape A that ultimately leads to shape B.

(Image source: Google Image search, but concretely this)

The better-known illustration is that, up to homotopy, a donut and a coffee mug are the same. Mathematicians love their counterintuitive truths, but from a broader theoretical standpoint this undersells the radical ambition of this program: to upheave naïve metaphysics of identity (implied, for example, by the analytical geometry according to which A and B are rigorously distinct) while establishing a process view of identification: A and B are “like” each other because they can be deformed into each other. In broader terms: there’s a path that A can undertake to become B, and symmetrically a path that B can undertake to become A. This is an ethical program.

(motu propio)

The following is a slightly less violent restatement of homotopy — still meant for broader theoretical and philosophical usage; you can’t learn math by reading. (1) A set is a collection or family or otherwise box of nonduplicate items, often called “points” for coolness. (2) A function f: U->V between sets U and V is a pairing that associates points u1, u2,… of U to one point f(u1), f(u2),… of V each. (3) A space is a collection of points with a vicinity structure. The vicinity structure tells you when two points u, v are close together: it’s a collection of closeness-concepts. (4) A function is continuous if whenever u, v are close, then f(u), f(v) are close. (5) The cartesian product U x V is the set of all pairs of elements of U and V; particularly, the cartesian product U x [0,1] is a set that stacks many copies of U, as many times as there are real numbers between 0 and 1. (6) A homotopy from U to V is a continuous function from U x [0,1] to V. Note that this function is both continuous in U (you can’t tear apart points that were close together) and in [0,1] (there can’t be leaps between adjacent versions of U, even if each is untorn). (7) U and V are the same up to homotopy if a homotopy can be obtained: if a path that obeys the axioms (which in the limit are undistinguishable from moral laws) of topological continuity can be found.

We had just declared that homotopy equivalence was an ethical program. This was something of a rhetorical overreach; it’s sometimes necessary to pause on key turning points so we can appreciate the madness in them. The better formula is: homotopy is a model for an ethical program. Humans act, in the general case, following a mashed-up conflation of is-nesses and ought-nesses. The radical distinction between is-nesses and ought-nesses, which has really been long established by men like Hume, is a minimorum prerequisite for being able to speak in-and-about axiologies at all, let alone General Axiology. If this distinction doesn’t “stick” in how people act, it’s because our ought-nesses are parameterized by is-nesses.

An if-then-else routine (or its homotopy equivalent) tells us what to do if we find a person lying face down on a sidewalk: is this a man or a woman? does he look homeless? does she look middle-class, similar-enough-to-me? Uriel Alexis’s “reality rules!” speaks to this fundamental is-ness: have you noticed that middle-class women are more attractive than poor panhandling ones? Did we help the former because of their looks, because of tribal belonging, or because our is-ness model of the world tells us we can’t help panhandlers anyway? Uriel’s Razor says these reasons are all the same.

Neoreactionaries go further and tell us there’s one specific vicinity structure that makes the human population-space topological. This is how axiomatics and morality are indistinguishable: they’re both concerned with rigor that will preserve true knowledge (mathema). But indistinguishability doesn’t quite entail “the same”. Remember, a homotopy is continuous not only “space-wise” (arbitrarily close points mapping to arbitrarily close points), but “path-wise” (in [0,1]; an uninterrupted transition going forward smoothly). There’s no homotopy path between the if-then-else that leads one to ignore the homeless-looking dude and the one that leads one to dismiss him as someone who can’t be helped. There’s morality here, not ethics.

(damnatio)

It’s somewhat distressing to google for the “difference between morality and ethics” and discover how widespread is the misunderstanding that there’s none. This is an incredible obstacle to the diffusion of axiological thinking. It does a lot to explain the emergence of professional ethicists who, profiting from the decline in religious spirituality, portend to speak from a place of lived-in wisdom (in the jargon, from truth-rain), through contemplation and towards action — three quick desiderata, a.e. non-exhaustive, that come up when imagining a newspaper column about ethics. The distinction between morality and ethics, much like the is-ought rift by Hume, has long been established by Spinoza and convincingly revived in the 20th century by Deleuze. But you needn’t be aware of these philosophical doctrines to have an under-the-skin feel for the distinction: a priest is someone who trains in morality but, when asked for advice, speaks in ethics.

It would be similarly distressing to learn that the distinction between laughter and fear had been forgotten. In all likelihood, there’s a deeper sense in which these are in equivalence — a homotopy-like path spanning a continuum of unintelligible human emotion. But there’s an obvious nonmoral view in which laughter and fear have positive and negative valences, respectively. The equivalence is obtained modulo some physiological generalities. Does this mean you should never scare someone for a laugh? People do this, it’s often fun for the victim too. Yet there’s a basic ethical choice to be made — in this frivolous example, one that’s not really that complicated — a path to traverse, in concrete action, through a pseudohomotopy class. The grand program of ethics — if it’s at all something that can even be squeezed like olive oil from the raw stuff of existential choice — is to classify all such scare-laugh-fright-fun situations.

All of this takes place in a fairly low-level axiology, mind you. As GPT-2 once said after ingesting a few of my writings:

At present we have no choice but to become stronger and do all of this in order to make the promise of General Axiology true: infinite wealth, infinite bliss, and unlimited freedom from our thought and actions – infinite power. We must also realise how to get stronger, stronger, stronger. As such, we can also gain the experience of developing new ways of living – and learn more when our efforts go ahead.

This also means we have to get the very basics right.

Core

alpha

The self-referencing bug that keeps affecting asemic horizon is actually two problems. One is the apparent constant need to revisit the space opera (the accumulating backlog of technical paraphernalia) for new readers, which by now has become an accumulation of explainers, each gradually becoming out of date with the current emphasis given to theory. The other problem is our seeming inability to perform an actual reboot — a hard archival of past texts in favor of a new beginning, a new approach to the core themes that, as a bonus, lets go of the dead-ends of the past

Then: these two problems are both editing problems. An audit of the asemic horizon‘s backlog reveals texts that tend to start either with chatty introspection in the style of what you’re current reading; that typically leads to a hook, which leads to a section II that’s clear in purpose. The theoretical import of the texts isn’t usually found until the last 1/5 of the material, and even then, in the kind of excited, near-vatic discourse that makes absolutely no sense unless you’ve committed to the #longform that precedes it.

A minority of texts has the opposite approach: they start dropping bombs that are fully unmotivated by anything of current interest to the reader. Most of these end up being retired not long after — accumulating statements like “a squegg is a square egg” is the opposite of theory — it isn’t la atteinte. A notable counter-example is The Wave, which for most purposes I still stand by.

Unfortunately, a significant degree of logorrhea is intrinsic to my technique. Have you noticed that sometimes words like “accumulating” start accumulating in a kind of a connotation slide? That’s intentional — and integral to what it all means.

anatomy

An exception made for that last comment on the deliberateness of style in theory writing, everything I just said gives the vibe that theory isn’t really under my control. This is a fair assessment. As much as I’m an independent-scholarly, margin note-writing type with overflowing wall-sized bookshelves, theory (and this is clear to anyone who reads the scholarly literature regularly) is not scholarly in style at all. There is no method: the texts pretty much write themselves,

But theory is not a kind of #longform poetry: more than internal rhymes, it has an internal mechanism. The cogs of this mechanism are words; this is why the jargon and the cant of theory keep growing indefinitely fast, but also why texts can never seem to follow a general plan, however vague, that would be intended in advance. The apparently-spontaneous (and yet inescapably determinate) internal rhyming of internal accumulations force my hand: the impressionistic analogy would be that, in the act of writing, the knitwork texture of the text begins to clasp on itself. This is, of course (but not that I knew of this before making my coffee) the impressionistic analogy of the point de capition.

Of course, this is enough of a match to be a dead-end: theory (or daygame, or corporate strategy) thrives on mismatches and productive misunderstandings. The interesting mismatch here is that of passive structural coherence with agency. And no, theory is not alive, but doesn’t this madcap suggestion vibe with the whole phenomenology of work that does itself? The false matches here have to do with constraints: one can no longer make theory crystalline and widely accessible (so I can take it on the road with podcasters, for example) than one can stretch a puppy to the desired format. The passive structural coherence of knitwork is not exactly sturdy, physically, but it can be indefinitely reconstructed (knitting is rather easy); the structural coherence of theory is messy like a living organism.

embryo

One of many reasons to keep Lacan is to understand + imitate + master is his basso continuo technique of sliding disavowal. This disavowal is understated and never presented as a real cut; being a single vatic source of knowledge, Lacan never faces the Kuhnian forces that produce “paradigm shifts” as breaks with a vested status quo — instead, the mirror stage and the Borromean knot are presented as one. I’d like to possess this technique: never really break with corny past writings like The Scenarios of Ecstasy (which tries to be seedy-clickbaity, polemizes against accelerationism, and still manages to move theory forward); rather restate them, possibly making fundamental changes in its core concepts. This dynamic operational doctrine for theory is not without its frictions with the limit-concept (generic structure + general axiology) tone of theory, but ça marche.

Of course, Lacan has a double head start: on the one hand, because people start with the conviction that psychoanalysis makes any kind of sense in the clinical setting (it doesn’t; Lacan is best read as a special rapporteur on alien civilizations); on the other, because he begins (and dies) while claiming continuity with Freud. I can’t do this latter; not with Deleuze, not with Heidegger, not with Lacan. If theory is to be received as an ever-growing, never-to-be-born embryo, it wil be as a pathological case of parthenogenesis. And yet, I can’t be sole parent here — to impossible-to-ignore degrees, theory writes me.

skyscraper

As it stands now theory has very few “building blocks”. Theory defines itself as a reaching gesture towards infinity, the theory of the theory of the… Still, the space opera is a load-bearing structure; the basic difficulty with asemic horizon is that the visibility of this structure is not quite aligned with its load-bearing power.

Ambit is a much more fundamental concept than the whole soteriology (the Hölderlin story); whatever we mumbled about McKenosha or, cringe, about faux-lesbians that cater to the male gaze, should really be retired, taken offline, never referred-to again. Why did ambit emerge so recently? Where was my mind? Tempo is more often referenced, but its theoretical development is spread over three texts, each of which has a whole different context as an opening. Quability has gone through more mutations than we can count (although in this case I think we’ve been able to effect some of that sliding-disavowal abra-cadabra); it remains a binary star with the Situation, which by now has lost much of its Heideggerean baggage. The central role of axiologies has become clearer and clearer with time — perhaps the singular notion that renews my faith in theory again and again and again (even if “larger” and “smaller” axiologies have to be revisited in terms of distinction and discernibility). But I don’t even know how to link to my own past writings anymore. Googling “this concept site:asemic-horizon.com” works.

I set out to write an essay that would look like an extended version of this last paragraph. Did I suspect it could evolve into yet another methodological meditation on theory itself? Sure. Have I lost readers that expected an embryo to be born by now? I happen to know, specifically, that yes. This is good. I haven’t enough followers to have a “core” that will stay through the process of sliding disavowal — therefore, it’s imperative to lose old readers and gain new ones. There’s a song by either Marilyn Manson or NIN (or maybe Slipknot?) that says “everything I give you is a piece of my death”.

That is how the limit-concept of theory works — most importantly, General Axiology — theory wins by erasing me (also you; society; distinction; discernibility — but I’m the one pushing this forward).

Modulo

I.

An axiom, we know well, is a police officer. The vagrancy law that no officer can abet is the identify of indiscernibles. This legal instrument regulates that which can be reasoned about; it demands that the objects of thinking are perceivable in their plurality — more simply, that two indiscernible things must be thought-of as one.

But humans, peckish and thieving, have a way around this. The law establishes identity from indiscernibility, but (in the generic case at least) leaves discernibility as non fingo. We can therefore use the up-to structure to commandeer and puppeteer identity. We can say “noon” up-to the day and never specify a date. We can reason about noons in general; we can, for example, invent longitude by measuring how fast noons are coming as we sail. This is how “applied” anything works.

In mathematics the up-to structure is available for integers in modular arithmetic. It is also available generically through equivalence classes and quotients (sets, groups, what have you). The theory of parity (odd/even structure) is ordinary arithmetic modulo 2; hours are arithmetic modulo 12 or 24: in the mod-12 style, 3 hours and 15 hours past midnight are both “three”. Each of these is an example of equivalence classes. Equivalence is a true upgrade from indiscernibility, one of those rare cases in which metaphysical conceit gets pwned by simple formal maths. Indeed, maybe there is no such thing as indiscernibility — maybe everything is indefinitely distinct, pantha rhei, and identity is a fully bogus idea.

This is immaterial — equivalence, a true gentleman, frees us from identity without undue punishment of its vanquished rival. We get a call-the-manager bell, a rape whistle, a get-out-of-jail-free card called modulo. Whenever in trouble, it’s always possible to scream it, modulo! The indefinite wealth of lived experience — each gust of wind, each passing wink — is safe and tucked away from mean cops.

II.

A good friend of asemic horizon counsels me on occasion to leave politics alone if I expect to make anything out of theory. He’s right — the political take space is way overcrowded and an interest in politics is an unwelcome signal of being chiefly interested in posturing about unactionable scenarios. Of course, asemic horizon emerges from politics originally; it emerges from the theoretical desire (the libido sciendi) of discussing the Brazilian situation modulo surface-level news events that obscure always-ongoing structural affairs. Improbably, this got us somewhere: everything worth discussing was worth something; structural affairs were always quotient affairs with axiologies.

[“Quotient” is very closely related to “modulo”; roughly, the quotient set of integers towards parity, or Z/2, is the set of integers modulo 2, or up-to-parity, or the set of equivalence classes of integers resp. parity; ultimately, the “set of parities”, an adjective having been wonderfully transmuted to a substantive. Political “affairs” are, of course, not sets; but every time “modulo” can be clearly used, so can “quotient”, wonderfully blinking between adjectival (theoretical) and substantive (actual-structural) form.]

This is not actually how theory was first discussed. Objects of discourse were declared not as actual classes, but as models of their quability conditions. Quability was akin to satisfiability in constraint-satisfaction theory. Everything was in the implicit solution to a (possibly unsolvable) system of equations, an inevitable consensus, a mad drift towards infinity. Talk of “quables” (which would be more or less amenable to the quotient form treatment) was sparse at first and died down entirely. There was, ultimately, a sense that this cosmic ambition — speaking only of the large-scale, inevitable conditioning factors, and the conditions on that, if needed – was the only way to build something that might, at some point, produce the vocabulary needed to say the unspeakable.

It can only follow that theory in the asemic horizon sense must be unintelligible. As forceful and overflowing with technicalia, the stuff of theory is in its minor inconsistencies. Theory is a mood. The mood sets the conditions for thinking; conversely, thinking must satisfy the mood.

III.

If I was to drop all pretense of quability theory to give a report on the ongoing situation, I’d have also to drop all of the sequence of quotients afforded by theory: I’d have to report on my city, on my neighborhood, on my street, on the birds and tree maintenance and emerging styles of leisurewear. I would need to become descriptive and colorful and convey an entirely new mood of exotica (not Colombian Magical Realism; maybe Structural Tropicalia) that set the conditions for understanding… something.

But it’s increasingly unclear that Structural Tropicalia holds any interest. All world politics has been suspended in favor of American politics, which sets the tone and the terms of (symbolic and monetary both) exchange. To the extent that politics away from the real world (i.e. America) still takes place, it does so in contravention of structural affairs. It’s reasonable to assume that even the Revolutionary Guard will lose its efficacy, that its gradual coup will lead to rule over empty cities.

The cosmic ambition that agitates quability theory can only grow in answer to this. Theory is waiting: therefore, it thrives in the despondency of the Real. The only real answer to stagnation and diminishing returns is to eat the sun itself. Given that theory is the theory of generic structure, and nothing at all can be meaningfully thought-about except if modulo generic structure, theory is the only means we have to prevent an ongoing symbolic (cultural, cognitive, hydraulic….) collapse.

Missing pieces

Tempo was a real coup — by all appearances the greatest act of technical hang gliding I’ve been able to pull off under all these (cognitive, time-budget, loss of single-minded focus and major themes) constraints. Diegesis was an still is an interesting concept; but isn’t it in some kind of tradition from Plato’s cave onto Baudrillard and beyond? Of course, diegesis manages to satisfy quite a few of my secret axiomata: it’s non-essentialistic, takes place in a membrane-like surface (rather than in the cave or in the grand dehors, and appeals directly to a dizzying cloud of technical tools. That these tools are readily recognizable by almost anyone in touch with mass culture is a bonus: theory’s scope of communicability surely needs improvements.

At one point, and not at all in the same vein, the overloaded Daseinwolke that writes asemic horizon came up with a set of notions it liked to shkrelishly call physics. I had actually been working on a note-taking/mind-mapping app (really for personal uses) that arranged information in freeform graphs (as far as “physics” goes, really best identified as 1-simplicial complexes that admit a Hodge theory). This is a typical case of “once unseen, can’t be unseen”: the mysteries of math are such that boundary operators can be identified in graphs with the “incidence matrices” that show up in pipe flow/Kirchoff’s law problems; and, with some more “Hodge star” trickery I won’t pretend to understand, the matrix Laplacian L=ITI corresponds to the Laplacian-as-in-sum-of-second-derivatives seen in potential theory. Then you can, given a graph that connects ideas, impose a graph-statistical “mass” concept and compute an “energy” function as simply as solving Lϕ=m. The bratty appellation of physics comes from the many actual physical problems (Gaussian gravity included) that are stated as Laplacian PDEs. Look, ma, technical stuff.

“Physics” actually worked — I use my own mind-mapping app, it’s really neat-o — but the mess of words that is asemic horizon jargon induced me to believe it a spatial counterpart to tempo — equally distributed, acentered (energy computations effectively destroying any semantics of global-ness in the use of graph statistics for “mass”), breakable in pieces. But it wasn’t. The relevant texts were retired as soon as I realized it — they were somewhat dreary with numerical examples and lacking in verve, anyway — and I’ve been acting like it didn’t happen at all since then. I mean, how many blind alleys is one supposed to meet while developing theory?

But as the anomie-fog of theory since the loss of Jairwave settles in, the wordmeaningcrash in “physics” becomes symptomatic of a lack — an incompleteness to the notion of clicky async tempo. Theory tells us that tempo clicks at an uneven discretized pace; that tempo at different sites also clicks to the beat of their own drums. The Situation is, therefore, identified the polyrhythmic pattern of clicking. Systemic constraints shaped like feedback signals weave their way through this chaotic symphony — death and sex themselves flowing as carried by packets of tempo, mounted on temporalities in such a way to giving way to the illusion of global time.

There’s more to this that has never been said: there must be a correlation between value systems and the sensitivity of this temps-supposé-global (found in your computer clock on the edge of your screen) to specific local temporalities. This is why the drums of war beat so loud, and why the game of “where were you when…” can’t be played with the death of Lisa “Left-eye” Lopez from commercial pop group “TLC”. The simple fact that people in serious low-level disagreement relate their temporalities to this ambient illusion tells us something empirical about axiology. In General Axiology we all know what’s going on

II.

I’ve been haunted lately by the word ambit. Etymologically it has to do with bodily movement, walking around, ambulating. It’s also a cousin word to “ambient”; both reach back to ambio — which does mean “going around”, but with particular tactical purpose: to walk around — to encircle. In current business parlance “ambit” means something similar to “scope”. The latter belong to the gaze (to scopophilia, not to ambulophilia); clearly some nuance is lost. Indeed, the ambit is as much related to marketing metrics as it is to mental partitions of the territory. Yes, yeeees, the incel scope and the Chad ambit, that’s how you do it.

There’s an implicit “spatiality” to tempo — but note the word, it’s not really there; at best it can be computed like we compute energy from mass; there’s also a temporality to the ambit (a matter of tactics before anything else), which is rather less (if at all) implicit. The ambit is real insofar it’s seen (scenarized as, etc.) as an implementation of tempo. The implicit spatiality of tempo is due to its polyphony: two things that click in unison must be the same. The polyphony is empirical evidence that at least two distinct things must exist; but to evince this distinction a strategic plan must be set in place. The fact that we perceive distinct things merely indicates that God or Natural Selection (or some joint-venture thereof) has already traced out the tactics of the ambit. Your pervert’s eyes encircle the world in saccades and circle around on body parts: yes, even scopes emerge from their ambit.

III.

We’ve seen that ambit, is at heart, a tactical notion. Can it ever “belong” to theory? Can we place ambit in our scopes? This problem catches me off guard. It’s likely what all the Lacan stuff had been building up to: theory can handle its scopic issues by conceptualizing them (scenarios, physique du role and so on), but the shortcomings of its ambit are not straightforward at all. If ambit is admitted into the diegesis of theory (in this mess of words you’re reading right now), will asemic-horizon.com’s traffic statistics come into play? If, in my capacity as a theory-maker, I have been a subpar tactician, does this put theory in question?

We’ve also seen that correlations in how the effect of temporality (not tempo, but the illusion that we ambulate in shared time) evince axiologies at degrees higher than our perceived value systems. This, too, has to do with the tactical dimension, and with the encircling motion that erects conceptual frameworks rather than declaring them. This is why theory, distanced as it is from any particular issue, often seems to bear on politics: there’s more than loose threads linking axiologies, diegesis, tempo to the large ambits of politics and ideology. Indeed, it often circles around them by deliberating on ambient conditions — quability conditions for the largest possible ambits.

This having become clear, it does feel that the credibility of theory becomes somewhat contingent on its own tactical success.

Nicht dieser Töne

I. 

What stands out the most about Grammarly, the style checker I’ve been using in hopes of writing intelligible text is its steadfast refusal to accept “Theory…” as an indeterminate object of discourse.

I’ve had, in casual conversation, many instances where theory is expected to be always transitive, and generally towards a specific hypothesis (“the theory that Polish jazz reflects a cerebral misunderstanding of its American sources”). On asemic horizon we say — everyone together now — theory is the theory of generic structure. Infinite recursion fixes the grammar (it is now “the theory” of something, namely “the theory of the theory…”). But it leaves much unsaid.

Despite all of its feverish juggling of neologisms (technical terms, each having a specific meaning), theory as practiced in asemic horizon is not an entirely new pursuit. We’re more inspired by Heino Engel’s Tragsysteme than by Adorno or Habermas; but it’s hard to deny their priority and their usefulness in making other people to understand what we mean by “theory”. I’d rather have you read Gilles Grelet, but what is he saying to an audience (even the freakish readership of asemic horizon) that isn’t in love with theory already?

The other thing was an attempt to communicate theory with “normies”. The risk of that venture is not being able to cleanly differentiate what K-Hole means by “acting basic” and “normcore” — roughly, the blend-in mimicry of leaf insects versus the outward movement towards “opportunities for strategic misunderstanding”. If theory is ever going to be valuable to normies, that’ll be because there are none. This is my standard case against incels and other such outcasts: STFU and dress normal. A beautiful paradox: there is no normalcy, just the ongoing awkwardness that makes us grab on the available equipment (and here we very literally mean what Heidegger means by das Zeug). This equipment produces an effect of tactical normalcy, itself an attempt to pro-duce (to bring into the world) the ambient conditions of prosocial connection.

II.

In the other thing we have at times claimed theory to be is: a praxis of intelligibility. It’s ultimately this that motivates the other thing — I sprinkle it liberally with notions that I can get paid for this if I play my cards right (and maybe I can, that’s none of your business), but the unlimited freedom afforded by asemic horizon is paid in blood with a descent towards irrelevance. We’ve explored the ways in which this descent ultimately leads to the switcheroo (ultimate genericity translated to ultimate generality at the critical moment) and to General Axiology.

Of course, the way out is through, but this is a very hard slog, and my repeated attempts to hang theory on some sort of formalism (SATPLAN, graph physics, Girardian logic) have produced more demands towards the formalism — this is like buying a clothesline and having to stand pulling on it until your shirts are dry. Theory only progresses by making little knots and little hooks — the points de capiton (faux lesbians, Crystal Castles, Misha the Bear, McKenosha yadda yadda). These have always had a calculated clickbait effect — I do want more readers; maybe these will have to come from the other thing — but they’re also fun and keep your spine straight as you fall down the great water slide that’s the genericity of genericities. 

III. 

Here’s a provocation: incels have a right to get laid. (I might have to freeze a definition that excludes people who have had sexual experience.)

The argument for this is twofold. First, incels have a right to get laid by whatever they imagine women to be (increasingly this takes a disturbing deantropic trend towards cartoons). Sex with imaginary women can be accomplished single-handedly, and for (physical, even) health reasons it’s often recommended (at least in the absence of real partners). The axiological trouble begins when real people are coerced in some fashion (deepfakes being a relatively nonviolent alternative to the old, worse ways) into pretend-playing to be imaginary women. Only then moral concerns come into play. This also neatly illustrates the difference between ethics and morality; inceldom is, to begin with, an ethical shortcoming. 

Second, incels have the right to get laid by real women — provided they’re able to connect with real women as such. “Consent” applies to a weaker formulation of this problem that we intend to sidestep altogether: forcing (or cajoling, blackmailing, etc) someone into sexual contact fundamentally disconnects you from them. The mystery of inceldom (particularly from the incel’s point of view) is that they can’t get women; but “getting women” means “being with women”. Seduction tricks are parlor tricks; attractiveness helps in seduction because sexuality can’t be unraveled from physical presence, but seduction is literally the subtractive counterpart of pro-duction — it means “to hide”. Typical incel blunders (at least as widely mocked on the internet) have to do with running directly into the attractive (and largely imaginary) thing, too much, too fast. “Negging” teaches them to do otherwise, but these people invariably overcorrect and miss their shot. Incels never really meet real women. 

The best advice for incels is, as above, STFU, dress normal. But this should recapitulate everything we’ve said about normalcy as a phenomenon of misinterpretation. Les non-dupes errent; what anyone wants is impossible; you misread it into them, they misread it into you. That’s how seduction works: you dress normal, then people misunderstand you.  Everyone is wrongly convinced that their ultimate value as humans lies in their agalma, but by virtue of feeling they don’t have much else to offer, incels are way too protective of the inner good person they think they are — and resent that others don’t see it. Thus the great virtue of attractiveness: people who are hot are able to signal their value in all sorts of ambiguous (and low-key) ways, while those who need to produce value-signaling effects that, paradoxically, hamper their ability to be ambiguous and get mismatches.

To be clear: this isn’t relationship advice. 

IV. 

Theory is seductive to the extent people misunderstand it. If I have to put forward a denunciation of, e.g. Austrian economics (which has happened), this loses some people. Of course, “just be more ambiguous” is about as useful as “just be more attractive”. There’s some constraints (the quability conditions of theory) that simply can’t be fucked with; and, of course, on asemic horizon you’re watching it happen live. Watching a nude wo/man taking showers over and over in a loop isn’t that erotic after a while. 

Going for “normies” in the other thing is a different affair. Dressing normal is challenging for a project that’s ultimately (however obscurely) revolutionary. There’s great sincerity in that project: we keep evoking Crystal Castles yadda yadda but theory needs a dozen Jairwaves to really emerge as a valuable pursuit in its own right. Everything that’s held to be valuable is already in/part of an axiological structure. And as much as we need to understand them, this process also has much to give back in terms of a clearer discernment of its structure, its dynamics, its tempo, diegesis, physics, scenarios…

Drawbridges

In the beginning there was Logos. Christian Bibles tend to translate this to the “Word”, or maybe the “Verb”. But Wiktionary tell us λόγος also means “speech, oration, discourse, quote, story, study, ratio, calculation, reason”. It further descends from the verbal phrase λέγω — I say or think. Insofar as logic is (quite literally) that which pertain to logos, it ultimately refers to that which can be said or thought. Our philosophical influences teach that, much like anything else in the Mechanosphere, the Said or the Thought are both operated in two movements — one of selection and one of consolidation. This is how the same word comes to mean both “oration” and “calculation”.

Logic is therefore twofold: a matter of production, and a matter of arrangement. This is so even in the 20th-century Tarskian program. The better logicians since then, such as Jean-Yves Girard, have pressed the issue of formatting. But the chrematistic promise of mathematics is to find invariants that hold for any representation within an equivalence class (e.g. up to isomorphisms or order-preserving transformations). The wages of abstraction are emancipation from the format. For example: 19th-century economists had to speak in bushels of this versus bushels of that, whereas modern mathematical economists can speak in measure spaces — therefore obtaining study, calculation and even oratory without quotes and ratios. In the Tarskian program speech and discourse should also vanish, subsumed under the mightier and mightier program of reason. There’s no reason why this shouldn’t work, but also no reason why it should. The proof is in the pudding; the pudding is in the eye of the beholder; the metaphor is a metaphor for the metaphor.

A philosophy of mathematics only emerges when philosophers fixate on mathematics as an object of philosophical inquiry. On its own, mathematics is fine; a philosopher who interviews a mathematician might come away with some kind of unstable “strategic platonism” or as well-gatekept but frank social construction — but these are philosophical, not mathematical issues. This is in stark distinction with science, which imports (in the precise sense that computer programmers are used to) a black-boxed metaphysics of materialist stabilism.

Whenever science has tried to give a scientific veneer to this imported metaphysics, it has looked childish: the agitating material cause of gravity is christened “the God particle” because, well, it causes stuff to clump together. (It takes a philosopher to imagine a world that is motion first — where differential equations are not solved anymore than “x=x” is in the stabilist’s gut) Mathematics, on the other hand, embarrasses itself only when it forgets the μάθημα — its royal knowledgeness — and tries to prove itself in an underlying true arrangement of symbols (the logic that would underwrite it). A delicious paradox — its deliciousness being that it’s no paradox at all: mathematics, which is “socially constructed”, exists anyway, like the natural course of a river. Meanwhile science might have so far scraped the tip of a rock and our theoparticles maybe special cases of special cases, contrived like epicycles and possibly very unlike the science of eventual receivers of the Voyager Golden Record.

This is why our message to the stars needs always to begin with Bach. It tells eventual interlocutors that we’re aware of the μάθημα, that it has emerged in some form in our midst. But also in the general case — there’s no harder or fraught with possibilities for error and self-delusion alternative to bringing our μάθημα to enemies or strangers of any kind. Take the arena of politics: how long until we stop pretending to have facts and figures and a tentative science of governance? Unless much of the general populace is evil (and actually, even then), there’s a raw (not royal: there is only one mathematics) knowledgeness to their points of view. What is it? Jazz musicians are interested in Chopin, photographers in Rothko, algebraic topologists in algebraic geometry. Surely enough, and exactly like in mathematics, not every raw insight has μάθημα to it — this is the point of true proofs in mathematics, to establish true theorems with true corollaries. Accessing the knowledgeness in situations requires the painful and frustrating act of thinking. But that’s precisely God’s one weird trick to transcendence and maybe even general axiology.

Fooled by convexity xxl

The battle cry of applied mathematics is: all models are wrong, some are useful. This is a barbarously ambiguous creed, and might apply to miniature models (like model trains, which try to reproduce much of the excitement and dynamics of real trains at a fraction of the cost) and instance models (like car models; or better yet, like natural numbers, which are supposed to implement Peano’s axioms, but in practice falter — who the hell looks at 1645003 golf balls and is able to produce 1645004 balls, even in imagination). “Dialectics” is a model in both senses: it’s (i) a crude oversimplification of history that does render some of its large-scale features visible, and (ii) an instance of an underlying logical structure (i.e. an arrangement of terms that yields reliable arguments).

Dialectics-as-model-train is wrong because it can’t account for the immense complexity of reality. But it does render visible the notion that situations contain contradictions. A Candidean quasidarwinism might argue, contrariwise, that actual ongoing situations are resolutions rather than problems — this is a common misreading of Chesterton’s fence. But contradictions are tense and unstable: they require outside energy to sustain. Therefore the model train of dialectics suggests that these have dynamical tendencies that will — in unspecified tempo — necessarily play themselves out to sublation (a kind of nonresolved resolution). This is how McKenosha appeared to many as a tipping point towards Trumpism: the contradictions in liberal politics were producing this horrifying scenario of revolutionary violence, and sublative resolutions couldn’t possibly come from within liberal politics. How did this not happen?

Dialectics-as-car-model is wrong because no actual object in the real world can obey axioms (interestingly enough, in Greek, axiomatikos means “police officer”; axiomatics violently enforces axiologies from the outside). But insofar the real object is approximately a model (i.e. satisfies the axiomatics), legible and reliable forms of argumentation are available for it. Since dialectics satisfies an endothermic internal logic where causality is subordinated to the conditions of stasis, it tells us something about the kinematic properties of dialectical contradictions. Kinematics is the study of motion as abstracted from its causal forces; a simple example is considering whether an object will fall off your table in light of its inherent center of gravity. McKenosha and Jairwave have, perhaps, counterintuitively, striking similarities in their kinematic configurations; they’re not, however, immersed in the similar force fields, and are obviously very different processes when seen as integral objects of analysis rather than kinematic models.

Clearly, different views correspond to different meanings of the word model, rigorously speaking: in one, models are downsampled from reality, while in the other models are upsampled from axiomatics. Or, in other words: in the first, models are built to be adequate to the “other thing”, while in the second, the “other thing” is built to be adequate to them. But theory advances by taking words literally and embracing such semantic collisions. This is how we arrive at a dual (dynamic/kinematic) understanding of dialectics, after all.

To the point: my understanding is that McKenosha failed to promote Trump to a position of inevitability (as the only possible sublative resolution) because the kinematics were all wrong. To begin with, the apparent energy (and one could, but does not need to make use of its insanity) of McKenosha is out of joint. It’s built as the antithesis to protofascism and white supremacy, and probably engineered to propagate an ipso facto that this “thesis” it opposes actually exists. But it clearly doesn’t. It’s a reaction toward something that isn’t there, by all appearances devised to simulate it through indirect effects (much like Blackbeard would produce the effect of extreme violence to scare people into fleeing). Therefore it can appear as large and important, but can’t achieve any concrete political goals — it’s batting at ghosts and holograms. I know people get hurt in these episodes, but people get scared at Disneyland rides too.

A straight case where the kinematics does work is the tension between secularism and biblical religion in American culture and politics, which is there and ultimately derives from unresolved contradictions that might date back to Aquinas and the absorption of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes into the heart of Christendom. Of course, slavery in America is a root contradiction of the American system that keeps evolving (through a civil war, deportation to Liberia, Jim Crow, “Crow Jim” in jazz, Rosa Parks and so on and so on). But the configuration it leads to is not one that makes McKenosha a model of politics to come: American descendants of slavery (ADOS — this is a term being used in woke spaces, and it’s pretty good!) are, on average, poorer in most valuable outcomes, but their culture has come to dominate American music. There’s also extreme inequality within the ADOS population, and enough wealth that woke claims that incel shooter Eliot Rodgers has privilege because he’s white collapse immediately if realized.

Yes, the worry that this risible current will continue to expand in power and change the terms of discourse is legitimate. But this does not follow from dialectics in any clear way. The ratchet and “the long march through the institutions” and such other phenomena can be modeled, with some degree of accuracy, in dialectics. But then the contradictions they trace back to are not coextensive with the ones that produce Trumpism and its demise; that is, the axiomatics to which they are adequate are similar but not at all equivalent.

So what was Trumpism anyway? In the framework of dialectics, it was a response to something. A low-hanging candidate is the contradictory logical structure of “neoliberalism” as personified in Obama, a dr. Manhattan kind of figure that presented himself as coming from the left and even enacted some policy towards left concerns — while accelerating the WBush program of global war and acting full-time in the service of Capital. Trump, on the other hand, came, to whatever he has, as a hustler. A billionaire loved by the working class, why not? In Trump we see much more clearly the second sense of model — he appears to have known by instinct that there was something (some axiomatics) he satisfied (whether steaks, casinos or right-populism); therefore he rises to power by capturing the wind, extending his arms like a kite. This is obviously not a fascist. And therefore not someone who can credibly fight something that claims to be an antifa rebellion.

Now, a great unknown is whether McKenosha will continue burning in a Biden presidency. Some commentators seem to think that, because it’s specifically anti-Trump, it should die as the chaotic climate of 2020 dies down too. But riots tend to arise in regions already controlled by the Blue Party; it’s strange to believe that a Blue President would change this. After all, “white supremacy” is a wide, all-encompassing system and mr. Biden too is an old creepy white dude. On the contrary, a cultural climate that continues to coddle McKenosha will strengthen it. The ironic “Mc” prefix will eventually fall off. The black irony of the “ratchet” is that all on the Left eventually find themselves on the Right.

Then, because the kinematics of McKenosha are all wrong, it can only sustain itself by continued energy input (read: money!) from the outside. At this juncture, it’s how it would quickly die: the bail funds dry out and social media agitators go unpaid. McKenosha isn’t real — but it’s in the dynamical preconditions for fascism (as brought to live by fervent anti-fa desire) to arise. We’re talking 2024 here.

Political actors who do wish to systematically oppose the possibility of fascism would do well to study the quability conditions of McKenosha. I have a day job, but enough free time that I can consult. Ring me!

We have never been neoliberals

Standard economics is denounced as a political program in disguise; and one that both implies and requires a greedy individualistic outlook on social life. The former may as well be true, insofar economic policies can be neatly divided between those that assume standard economics and those (mostly in third world shitholes) that reject it. But the latter is wrong.

An Econ 101 class will teach you that the field is divided in two more or less independent disciplines, Macro and Microeconomics. The object of Macro is ultimately the Dasein of social life as bounded by the reach of policy. It speaks in moods and fears. As a theory, it’s pretty much the primus inter pares of systems theory; it encompasses everything from mineralogy to demography as stylized feedback loops that actually explain the world. On the other hand, micro as a theory says nothing about individuals at all; it speaks in choice structures that (in the version taught in undergrad) are reconciled by an Auctioneer (in Lacan-speak, the point de capiton; in Deleuze-speak, the Virtual). Nothing about this rejects inconsistent decision-making or even multiple personalities. If I’m different persons when drunk or sober, manic or depressive — I’m still selling my time and buying consumer goods, albeit at possibly highly unequal rates.

Indeed, read correctly, the technical lemmata of micro-level theory that prove the inconsistency of aggregate demand and choice (in stark contrast to the non fingo attitude of macroeconomics toward these things) also pose hard constraints on the possibility of individuation itself. The political program of neoliberalism is distinguished from nationalistic, class-interest or otherwise collectivistic programs because it claims that the smallest minority is the individual. But this is actually false: if I’m one person at work, one person as a parent, one person when drunk and one person when manic, guess what: boom, Arrow’s impossibility theorem applies. There’s no I there that can vote. May I insist, this follows straightforwardly from how micro theory understands choice (101 textbooks say “agents”, not “people”; and a deep dive will reveal that what is rigorously meant is agencies), and from the axioms in Arrow’s theorem.

This is what grand axiology does (in this case, an axiology built around the concept of choice, which is probably not fully general): it “de-necessitates” it’s supposed causability chains (sovereign individuality, and worse yet, “rational” choice — a word improperly confused with Enlightenment ideals). Now: micro theory at one point in the 1920s was being used to argue that scientific socialist planning was indeed possible if we could only have means to simulate the secret sauce of market economics. This didn’t pan out (as the more reasonable linear programming project of Kantorovich also didn’t back in the USSR); but did neoliberalism? For a couple of glorious years, even Byte magazine explained that on the Internet one has countless personas, but this, too, didn’t last for long. As it turns out, most people seem to value greatly a kind of continuity between their offline “persona” and their online presence; and more generally a continuity between a group-belonging that warrants their values and the truth of their morality.

Of course: neoliberalism was also a power grab. But so was 20th-century unionism. From a tentative (but frail and not fully thought out) higher-axiology vantage point, it would seem that these press the question of how you, the reader, should value yourself more: as consumer or as worker. In each case, the power grab is enabled by the kind of power it gives you. But neoliberalism (and this is counteracted somewhat by other forces allied to the neoliberal movement, such as cultural and religious conservatism) seems to offer the power to shatter the mirror that produces the illusion of a cohesive identity. You don’t go to the market and say “as a philosopher I want these shoes; as a scientist I want this cutler set whose heft feels like a restaurant’s”. Something disorganized in you wants them. This is also, of course, why drugs disseminate in common circles: you no longer have to be a decadent poet to acquire, as such, some opium.

A Freudian would, at this point, conclude that neoliberal consumerism produces a psychological regression to toddlerhood, but this smuggles strange, alienated-adult values into the word “regression”. Consumerism does seem to heighten (here I’m resorting more to my experience, but you’ll validate it with yours) immature tendencies: people fight over parking lot spaces at malls, it’s awful. But this isn’t infantilism per se, many kids are nice and cooperative by default.

In contradistinction unionism (or whatever new movement that wants to give you power as an X-type person — yes, much of this applies to McKenosha) appeals to a kind of double adulthood where not only you’re endowed with a mature adult socialization, but also you’re able to see the union as the doubly adult body that regulates its relative infantile parts by binding them to the collective contract.

But there’s different approaches to infantile regression and nested adult/adult infancy hierarchies both. Politically motivated trolls (frogs and clowns and all that) employ utterly childish aesthetics and behavior to question group-inflicted adulthood-structures. Why does Pepe say “lol Hillary” and sides with Trump, and not the opposite? Well, isn’t it pathetic how she had to stand back to give way to Obama and waited patiently for her turn — fairly given to her by the adult-of-adult bodies (the party) and the adult that regulates them (political interests at large in the equilibrium producing the stable party)? Trump, on the other hand, launches his entire political career babbling like a toddler about Mexican rapists, but ten days later decides (in a sudden moment of insight while eating faux-Mexican food) he loves them. But Trump (to trust most of my American friends, about 3/4 of them) is no toddler — no toddler can be evil.

As for the nested adulthood structure where the group is the adult that regulates its children… isn’t this how the hierarchy (maybe even the lattice/poset) of larger and smaller axiologies works? In general axiology we’re maximally mature and agree on the most important and generic issues of theory and praxis. Of course, the “trick” here is that, while we’re promised “infinite power” in general axiology, there’s no going up in a corporate ladder, no gradual acquisition of power (that both implies and requires power grabs elsewhere). This is why a toddler-like attitude may be required to explore systems of value and valuable means to acquire them: a refusal of adulthood as submission to the higher adulthood of groups, but rather an experimental and naive (even if deadly serious, as children often are in their games of imagination) openness to the Situation.

On a personal note, this is also why I (despite all my conservative adult instincts) remain a revolutionary, and theory remains a revolutionary project.