I. (Mirror scene)

My twitter bio bears a mangled quote from asemic horizon that witnesses (a phrase is a witness; think of this for a while) to the fundamental distinction between the I and the we voices: it says

Theory is, after all, a praxis of intelligibility; and there is nothing intelligible about the inevitability of revolution.

which, of course, runs counter to my apparent (i.e. ostensible) politics. Personal inclinations, ça va sans dire, are not counter to theoretical investigation; indeed, they are active elements. It was, after all, my openness to Jairwave (something that no other theoretician of revolution could achieve) that got us into the rabbit hole.

Of course, the inevitability thesis is somewhat more subtle: the original source material actually says (emphasis formatting maintained)

Theory is, after all, a praxis of intelligibility, whether sincere or contrived, serious or droll, and there’s nothing intelligible about the inevitability of revolution — where, of course, “revolution” has pretty much been redefined to mean the unintelligible inevitability that looms over our attempts to arrest the [axiology] drift.

This is, perhaps, the finest example of generic formulation: it fits a conservative outlook on social change by suggesting that revolutionary work is unnecessary (but note that this is reflected in the dialectics of collapse in OG Marxism, for example); but this sly suggestion (not fully implied by the quote) in turn implies that counter-revolutionary work is futile — thus also unnecessary.

Inevitability implies an event horizon beyond (my and your) machinations; the aporia in the “sly suggestion” implies this event horizon is directionless and therefore void of meaning — an asemic horizon. In turn, the claim to a genericity that would permit the sly suggestion to arise claims a kind of ecstasy/ek-stasis of theory. And there is the fucking rub: “doing ecstatic theory” presupposes the I/we voice split.

This leaves us running in circles, like in a hamster wheel: the ecstasy of theory requires the voice split, but the voice split is (or tries to be) a filter around what’s lived-context, praxis, typing fingers, and what’s pure and void and thought out. What’s being filtered is theory; but each time something that’s not theory is revealed.

The supremum of theory takes place in the kind of universal algebra where the “smaller” and “larger” of axiologies are formalized (and thereafter erased or colored into the background) as “meets” and “joins”. But this is probably beyond my present effort-investment in asemic horizon, and also virtually devoid of interest to anyone who hasn’t been seduced by General Axiology yet. The infimum of theory is, well, the “take”. In a perverse way, all you get (for the time being) is my take on theory.

II. (Soleá por bulerías)

The hardest known material is not really hard: it’s (our word, not theirs) delocalized:

Our architecture derives its extreme hardness from the local resonance between the embedded ceramics in a flexible cellular matrix and the attacking tool, which produces high-frequency vibrations at the interface. The incomplete consolidation of the ceramic grains during the manufacturing also promoted fragmentation of the ceramic spheres into micron-size particulate matter, which provided an abrasive interface with increasing resistance at higher loading rates. 

Ideas such as decentralization and desynchronization cut a vertical stroke through theory. This stroke touches the very beginning: Macunaíma as the widespread amorality that underwrote the (selectively scrutinized) behavior of politicians. But we grew up fast; decentralizing tempo taught us about the asynchronous structure of actual ongoing conditions; decentralizing relations of proximity and similarity gave us ideas about the very physics that underwrite the ambient conditions. If we weren’t so deeply reverential about the man, this could very well be nicknamed the Deleuze story: not because there is anything rhizomatic about it, but because it builds on local models of the world — graphs and differential geometry, rather than “global” vector calculus or algebraic topology.

But not every concept of theory is local; indeed there is often a deep ambiguity (say, in physique du role) between local and global features. This ambiguity is due to the fact that both “local” and “global” are indexed by an ambient sense of “place”, whereas in the general case concepts are place-less (delocalized). Physique du role is neither in Alice Glass’s withdrawal nor in her lithe contours and minxy allure; it’s not in the reach of her actions, nor in evolutionary psychology, neither in her personality nor in her sexual suggestions. It (the quability conditions of “Alice Practice”) happens to her as much as it does to anyone else.

This false local/global dichotomy has not escaped the daredevil engineers in their quest for hard-to-cut composite material:

Local changes in the microstructure of the ceramic sphere material resulting from localized heating (due to friction with the cutting blade) could enable a phase change and densification of alumina under certain conditions. Such material hardening on the surface of the spheres is likely to further enhance the cutting resistance of our architected material and should be investigated in future studies.

Of course, Delanda has said in his Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy that Deleuze and Guattari should be understood as 24th century engineers. That’s seduction, whereas engineering is concerned with production (to make appear. Yet this kind of Star Trek engineering remains exceedingly rare (while clearly possible even in 2020) because you can’t make people think in new ways. I can’t even show you where I’ve been in my own theoretical awakening — not in theory; not without crossing the I/we split. At best, one can try to evoke a whirlwind and an invitation to a kind of trance experience — an experience of ecstasis, ek-stasis, a state of being beside oneself.

The Game


A lot of theory-making is about taking words way too literally — to the end of their meaning, their asemic horizon. If there is any truth to the analytic account of “slips of the tongue”, then language is a buildup of such accidental disclosures. If only for this reason, there’s often profit in staring back at language coldly.

In most human-scale situations, objects are illuminated from multiple, dispersed directions. First-principles thinking teaches us that this light comes from a strict handful of sources, among which in huge disproportion the sun. But what we understand to be light is always-already scattered; first by the large-scale structure of the universe, then by the layered bureaucracy of the atmosphere, and finally by the colorature of the world itself, which always reflects back some of what it does. As a result, clear surfaces like lakes and rivers, shot by light energy from low and high angles alike, appears reflective and sometimes opaque.

Here Jacques Siboni’s elaboration on the Four Discourses of Lacanian theory is particularly helpful. The Master says: the water is clear; the hysteric says it’s clearly not — it’s a mirror of the sky. Whenever in control of the diegesis, the Master then deploys extradiegetic technologies that act not in the water, but in the light: namely, he introduces polarizing filters that can make it maximally transparent or reflective at will.

Isn’t this how political polarization works? The standard critique of polarization charges it with a Cartesian demonology of illusions: we’re not divided societies, but the diegesis can be arranged in such a way that we appear divided to the extreme. If this “discourse of the Master” (which silently posits a very large axiology that deep-down unites us and that we’re only temporarily unable to see due to the smoke) is Proposition A, Proposition B must be the charge that increasing polarization is an actual dynamic, an out-of-control dynamo that melts the once-promised large axiologies into air.

But how are these propositions actually implemented in politics? The very thin and soupy nature of contemporary-as-of-2020 symbolic political struggles has increasingly highlighted that there are considerable structural affairs behind and beyond the childishness of loud anti-trumpism and anti-bolsonarism playing at vanguard politics. Some good text has come out of this in the American scenario: text exploring patronage networks and underlying class interest and-so-on-and-so-on. Unpolarized light carries the day; polarization is a filter, a layer, and to the extent that it vanishes outside the frame it’s a mere diegetic trick.


Life outside the American system — which is set up so that there are red and blue teams — can take different shades. Take Brazil: the more strident the vanguard wings grow, the more the enabling power of the Old Center grows.

The Brazilian federal congress was established in its current form in the late 40s and, for all the hullaballoo about a protracted military intervention in political affairs, was never really dissolved. Representatives are not elected in concrete districts, but nominal and half-secretive lists; you get to choose one name, but if he’s already elected, his votes spill over to the smaller-fish politicos of his (true, ex ante suffrage) choosing. Add to this the gross over-representation of sparsely populated states that are about as far from Rio-São Paulo as Madrid is from Petersburg, on one hand, and the general over-representation of the People by some 600 mouths, a crowd with an intricate social structure that determines their access to the levers of power. They will tell you that the ’89 Constitution was, contrary to previous reboots of the state machine, legitimized by the people — but back in the 80s all talk of electing an actual Constitutional Assembly were drowned in some loud talk about direct presidential elections… and the Congress crowned itself supreme lawmaker to draft the Supreme Law.

The upshot is that under the rules of presidentalism, the People tend to elect highly-visible federal executives that come with clear-cut ostensible political agendas, but the executive must secure the support of Congress somehow. Now, if Congress is continually engaged in backstabbing melee fight, this opens space for clever maneuvering through the procedural shortcuts that only primum inter pares congressmen can navigate. But if we insist on ideology and truth in our politics, this Tim Ferriss-lifehacking tactic loses teeth. The Centrão (the political machine among political machines, so finely tunebd that the local jargon is “physiological”) therefore gains importance. Democracy affords the People free snacks, but not free lunch: the sharpest pin-pricks at Macunaíma are returned by the dullest and strongest wallops from its great big belly. They say Jair has been making increasing overtures to the Centrão — which would be nothing new; Dilma had her cabinet stacked with ministries for fisheries and such minutiae, filled with ideological blanks. Macunaíma.


Since God is a lobster (cf. Gilles Deleuze & the Sundance Kid — “The Geology of Morals”), every process is twice (first, to select, then, to fold). It took me way too long to understand the implications of this and I won’t pretend either to explain them or indulge in the affectation that my particular misapprehension can aspire to any degree of “canonicity”. Indeed everything that is maximally structured and whole and sublime must find itself in a kind of symplectic complementary-ness to the absence of meaning in the absence of meaning. This is why we must avoid both naïve validation and outright skepticism of actual ongoing revolutionary movements — more often than not it pays to be very literal: movements, motion, kinetic energy — that can be seen from our windows to the world. Everything flows — everyprocess is movement; and the loudness in this or that cultural outcry should not move us beyond the essential indifference demanded not only by theory, but also philosophy, spirituality and even, to some significant extent, civilization.

Political analysis is either gossip from streets and corridors, or high structural theory from mountains and offices. But what agitates gossip is a kind of structural theory that projects an affectation of meaninglessness and hip while reporting on the truth that cynical actors let through in the pauses between words. Likewise, a kind of gossip about transient impulse-response waves separates high theory from a kind of Vulcan spiritual slumber. The contours of these transients tell theory that its fundamental conceit is correct and just; at the same time, they provide the opportunity and the temptation to speculate on the surrounding context. Gossip-mongers are unconscious analysts (in the precise sense of Lacan’s four discourses); theorists are almost invariably hysterics, to the point that theory should be investigated as a personality disorder.

So what’s the deal with theory? There’s a lot to read about it in this website.

What’s the deal, instead, with pick-up artists and seduction teachers? They are worth deeper investigation, and not only because there seems to be a Venn circle between people interested in theory and in “pick-up”. At first blush, there’s a lot of misogyny — dehumanizing and off-putting to another type of theory-seeker. But there’s much to deconstruct in this misogyny, and behind the song-and-dance of “women are for the womanly things I’m lacking in right now”, there’s a roughed-up foregrounding of value as the dynamic valve underlying the gap between what these men want and what they get. By suspending the distracting idea that women, too, have value, teachers of seduction seem to be actually teaching production: men must improve, on their own, for their own sake, to the limit point (the asexual horizon) where they lose their clingy ethos and stop needing women in a fundamental existential sense. Only then can they emerge as actual misogynists — and hopefully, snap out of it by talking to women and realizing (bringing back from reality) their humanity.


Forceful as the buildup of testosterone makes this stuff read like, it’s relatively straightforward as a structural/axiological affair. The buildup in testosterone means it’s hard for them to stare at words coldly, take them to a limit horizon that is asemic but sexual and get a boost in abstraction powers from it. Still, the larger-and-larger axiology tends to find all the structural motifs that reconcile theory, chrematistics, pick-up methods, politics of all kinds and more, many more. There’s a bit of a leap of faith to be made here, but it’s closer to the leap of faith in the beginning of math textbooks than the one that leads followers of Osho to build Rajneeshpuram. What is asked that you believe is that politics is an example, a particular case that, like pick-up methodology and eventually theory itself, needs to be absorbed in the higher axiologies. In higher axiologies disagreements become less and less relevant. In general axiology whatever powers we have are fused together. Emergence means something new rises up. To what transcends “everything we have” we attribute the extent of infinity. Infinite bliss. Infinite wisdom. Infinite wealth. Infinite power.

There’s a probably apocryphal peroration on Roman stoicism which says — everyone must play the game. The ball is everything while in game. But when the game ends and the ball is tossed aside, it’s worthless. General axiology is not the ball.



Could you explain Galilean relativity to an anatomically modern human from 25,000 years ago?

Galilean relativity is at the core of what natural science defines to be the world. Its threefold tenets: (1) that the world is stable (i.e. it obeys eternal laws), (2) homogeneous (ontically uniform, there being no privileged locations) and (3) isotropic (ontologically uniform, there being no privileged frames).

The great scientific achievement of the Enlightenment is that we find these tenets within the reach of believability. We’re told (and trusting so has enabled the true miracles of technology) that the large-scale structure of the universe (something that only fools and philosophers would fail to identify with the world as presented) obeys these strange rules of uniformity (nomic, ontic and ontologic). But try telling this to our imaginary time-traveler.

The words “anatomically modern” mean that our new friend is exactly like us in every material aspect: same toes, guts, heart, voice box, eyes, brain, hair. Indeed, if we could secure contact with a live specimen, we’d have splayed, in the (stable, homogeneous, isotropic) space between us and him, the entirety of the mind-body problem. What’s more, the smash hit that is the Enlightenment might as well lead us to think that what distinguishes us from him is that we’ve been educated in Galilean relativity (both in physics and in the Moldbuggian sciences).

We are, after all, from the future. What can we possibly learn from Thag? There is chatter of “paleo” diets, but we certainly wouldn’t take his eating habits as an ideal — let alone his attitudes towards gender and race relations, vaccines, chord changes, monetary policy…

It’s well possible that our friend could learn to speak (the H. Sapiens brain organ is pretty nifty). We could then try and have a precivilized discussion about the tenets of Galilean relativity. To put words in Thag’s mouth is, of course, declassé — but in your speculative mind, try asking him:

— Thag, is the world stable?

— Thag, is the world homogenous?

— Thag, is the world isotropic?

It’s not that we’re supposed to take his answers over those of Neil deGrasse Tyson PhD, exactly; rather, we are to assume his beliefs on Galilean relativity reflect his world, not ours. But subsequently — if Thag’s responses were anything unlike the Enlightenment ones — we have to ponder what could have caused the world to change from his time to ours.


Could you explain pandemics, race riots, power grabs by elder councils or, heck, rocket launches to Thag, an anatomically modern dude from a hundred thousand generations ago? I’d bet you (assuming language acquisition) cash money that you could. With some more effort, you could even explain the basics of Lacanian psychoanalysis. He’s the same as you, no less intelligent or “more primitive” in any objective sense.

Since Galilean relativity is three bits deep (there are eight possible beliefs), the exhaustive enumeration of cases gets somewhat repetitive. The interesting extremes are that his world is three bits on Galilean (111, and therefore exactly like ours) or that it’s three bits off (000): non-stable, non-homogeneous, non-isotropic. We’re assuming, rather optimistically, that if his ancient world is Galilean (111), everything else in our culture can be conveyed. Otherwise, if his world is off-Galilean in some combination (000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110), there are certainly aspects of our culture that can’t be conveyed (modern science, broadly, but also much of what Moldbug terms the Cathedral).

Likewise, if our beliefs about Galilean relatively were full-up always-on 111, we’d be unable to comprehend anything that didn’t agree with Galileo-111. But we are: we live in a time and a space that are contingent, heterogeneous and ambivalent. Thus the graph laplacians: the large-scale structure of the universe may be Galileo-111, but generic structure is, well, more generic than that.


It’s rather obvious that Thag would readily understand that people sometimes don’t get along. Having grown in a small band or roving tribe, he might also understand that circumstance and common interest can align a few fellow humans in the same effort. Thag has deep knowledge and investment in an axiology where wants and crushing needs are at best dimly distinguished. This axiology probably has no name, even if Thag’s band has some abstract language: tools are abstract, but the hunger for food and sex is Nature’s boot pressing on his neck before it is desire. It’s not even hunger yet — it is only at the point where food has lost its place as ultimate value that one can self-starve for spiritual enlightenment, political statement or the search for a flat tummy.

It’s tempting to give Thag’s axiology the status of first axiology and unwind some purple prose (the genericity of genericities, etc.) from it. The temptation comes from the power of words themselves: out of some factoids about hunger and strife, an origin myth seems to congeal on its own. But there is no Thag. There’s no time-travel encounter; there’s also no clear universality to the human condition before language. What was the world like before food silos and recorded memory? Contingent, heterogeneous and ambivalent.

Still, there’s some value in designating certain axiologies as “from within scarcity”. This designation gives some clarification to the idea that there are smaller and larger axiologies: namely, any axiology from without scarcity is larger than one from within. An alternate name might be “from within suffocation” — axiologies arising from the situation where one’s desire and the boot pressing on one’s neck are one and the same.

It would be further desirable (note the placement of words) that scarcity and suffocation can be translated to relative terms such that a smaller axiology is “scarce” or “suffocating” with relation to its larger counterpart. But this is a difficult step; it would mean, for one, that all the actual axiologies in our actual-ongoing Situation are suffocating with respect to General Axiology. Reversing language may yield better imagery: in General Axiology, we will all breathe easy.

How to do things with theory


In Outwards we have the seminal (if  “more badly-written” than the average AH text) essay on what we’ll keep calling physics — to the dismay of I-fucking-love-science fans and maybe even some scientists. There’s something to the dynamics of theory-making (and not just AH, but philosophy, continental and analytic alike, linguistics, psychoanalysis, etc.) that leads it to eventually “abuse” or overlap the terminology of science. More often than not the principal reason for this is rhetorical, whether to borrow the self-importance of science and mathematics (like in Badiou) or to stress that certain points have to be understood as technical and isolated from hermeneutics (like in Lacan’s graph of desire and four discourses). It doesn’t help, of course, that these guys have very little training in the hard disciplines.

I like to think of what we’re doing as far more honest. The calculus on graphs can be rigorously constructed in a very general setting — many people are aware how differentiation in grid-like graphs converges to the ordinary calc-101 differentiation as it gets finer, but that’s not the point at all: graphs (rigorously, rigorously rigorously!) generalize the ordinary (continuum) setting where continuum physics is built. Let us get this out of the way at once: what we call physics is indeed physics, but not a physics of the natural world. What, then? It really depends: even on my note-taking app I’m continually fiddling with what is understood to be “mass”, with whether boundary values should be set to obtain conservative potential fields or what semantics are given to boundary values.

In this way, physics matches the distributed-but-heterogeneous nature of tempo. This match happens because both concepts are indexed to the world we operate in. The gaps between dt (continuous time, chronos, what have you) and the time we experience have long been the subject of dense contention from Bergson to neuroscience features in The Atlantic. A common wisdom prevalent in “learned” folks tends to interpret such gaps as issues of perception — paradoxes, yes, but ones where “the buck stops here”; where the valuable way is to humble ourselves to dt — in the limit, to the meillassouxsian Great Outdoors. The reactionary politics implicit in this attitude make sure it never gets far; but the objectification of time is one of the boundary value conditions that this learned wisdom needs to hammer down in order to mess with other aspects that have greater political leverage. Therefore “July 4, 1776” is a definite interval comprising 86 400 000 milliseconds,  but the date of American independence is up for grabs.

Here we must rigorously follow Moldbug’s ratchet strategy: sure, highlighting the continuity of slavery across the times of the American revolution, woo hoo, but aren’t they insufficiently revolutionary by failing to question time itself? And what is the physics of this “America”?


One reason theory is not particularly truth-valued is that theory is the theory of generic structure (I’d love to see the first person who tattoos this), which pulls it in an apraxic, axiology-first direction. But another, so far only diffusely alluded to, is that epistemics is the scold of perception. Rationalism, which flocks to epistemics like high-powered executives flock to leather-clad whip-yielding escorts, tells us that perception is a fairweather lover but submission (mock submission, at that) is much more erotic, i.e. life-giving. There’s good arguments in both directions; if the analogy were to hold all the way through, we could say that the healthy middle is to love perception and have it play epistemics (eg. make small predictions) for kicks. My own note-taking physics gizmo is some light kink thing in this way: that’s a lot of maths for a catalog of jazz records and session players.

But there’s always been a slight ambivalence about the vaunted “apraxic character of theory”. General Axiology has always been both “ultimate wisdom” and “ultim,ate power”. If we haven’t rushed to make good on the latter promise, it’s because we had and still have very little in this respect. It was nevertheless always clear that it was in the cards and we just needed to press on. Clear to me and therefore hopefully to us; the never-before-explained reason of the I/we voice switching is that as we progress to general axiology the distinction melts down.

The mistake made by most kinksters is to worship prediction. Prediction is a partial object (the petit a); its seductive power both conceals and suggests a wholeness of being-alive-in-the-world like paraphilic objects seem to conceal a wholeness of sexuality. But it’s all too easy to fetishize the seduction itself, the impediment to fulfillment as a higher form of enjoyment. Division of labor encourages many of us to derive some kind of endorphin rush from predictions that lock us out of actual climax.

The name of this actual climax is operation. Praxis is, in contrast, an act-first-think-later kind of method; pragmatist philosophy tells us “no ideas but in things”. But engaging the world through theory works otherwise: one works up a frenzy of thought until it becomes operational.   Thought is engaged by theory because it wants to see what its seduction conceals — the thing itself, the whole thing — but can only go all the way through by understanding this wholeness part by part, realizing (yes, bringing back from reality) that skin is made of pores, distributed, asynchronous, complexly connected.

Breadcrumb trails

It’s difficult to parse asemic horizon without going over the whole thing; but the following previously-unpublished fragment cuts directly to the soaring strings.

My last text introduced (not accidentally) a non-concept, the scenario. The scenario is a framing device. It sets up some patch of the Situation for some human drama, which is surely contrary to theory’s constitutive apraxia. What it frames is diegesis (two drunk girls making out for/at an objectifying gaze). What the frame is made of, that’s interesting.

If this appears to you as a repetition of the idea of the seduction of theory, you get a prize. But in a perverse way the seduction of theory is in the diegesis, it’s a fourth-wall-breaker that reminds you of the frame. It reminds you that vatic discourse is ludic discourse. Even as someone is getting handsy with your brain it reminds you to push them away gently and reassess the ongoing scenario.

You were told that there would be something something Bolsonaro here. We knew this was a huge structural story to be told. What we didn’t realize at first is that Jair is nondiegetic. He’s not the college girls kissing, he’s a technique of musical mood overlay or camera movement or some such movie magic. Bolsonaro is a lens by which the constitutional crisis gets told.

No, no, not just that. Bolsonaro is the only lens by which the constitutional crisis gets told. You shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall set you free. (April 2019)

What happens now is that the story of the “Brazil opera” (by comparison to our previously-vaunted “space opera”) can no longer be told.

The rhubarb to the effect that history is written by the winners holds only within certain proportions: past a certain scale, the “losers” cease to even register and Whig history dissolves into perennial philosophy. Traces of such a dissolution can be found here and there — in puzzling historical controversies (bimetallism in the United States; or the Religious Question that dogged Peter II of Brazil) that are in effect unintelligible to our present time. Indeed it’s easier to deeply recognize what Mark Anthony and Julius Caesar went through than to feign superficial understanding of Comtean religion in turn-of-the-20th century Brazil.

Winners do often write losers into history as they see fit. But history is pregnant with countless revisionisms. They might now topple the government and arrest the man and his ravaged guts.  Present and future countercurrents may in turn try to retell this story, to put everything in such a context that the downfall seems to never have happened anyway, like a soccer goal by offside rules. But Bolsonaro’s politics can never be whole without the Truth (like left politics can never be whole without the People).

I don’t think Bolsonaro knows this. I don’t think he knows how much his actual political project (as opposed to whatever he might morph into now, courting parliamentary support in the so-called Centrão and getting dragged by swampy quid pro quo presidentialism) depended on it. Robbed of his truth-rain, Bolsonaro’s story is probably going to be up-serted into a generic macunaímic narrative of fruitless challenges “from the right” (or even some further signifier yet to be pro/duced).

The constitutional crisis vanishes. Journalists applaud the very Supreme Court-led inquisition that no more than  a year ago had censored them. A victor’s history  without losers emerges: nothing of any importance has happened! This is what Moro’s Brutus-like stab is supposed to say — should anything happen, good or bad, the show (the continuity of the diegesis) must be aborted; the very theater must be “deconstructed” starting immediately, even if so gradually that it doesn’t really show.


Jairwave (2018-2020)

Brazil’s relatively large (if well under-proportional) weight in international affairs notwithstanding, you may still not be informed that Jair Bolsonaro dun goofed.

His anomalous character — his glitch — had been chipping away in small pieces in the last baker’s dozen of weeks. But this is something different now. It isn’t in truth-rain. It doesn’t pose the Big Questions that had kickstarted this blog.

I have to say — I’m grateful to him for having provoked this whole thing in first place.

I took enough care that I wouldn’t be embarrassed when Jair’s intuitive tenure in power came to contradict Jairwave, das Rettende; when it came in alignment with Macunaíma. I mean, he’s not particularly intelligent, is he? It was never — ever — argued that this meathead would take us to General Axiology. Not even in deleted texts or drafts. Too divisive. Not how it works. Theory will be fine! Theory is (mostly) fine!

Only one thing is left to pick up from the ground, to rinse off and reset: truth-rain.

Truth-rain is relatively well received (much in excess of the rest of my conceptual framework) in theory-talk Telegram chatrooms. But now it runs the risk of drowning in metaphysics; of accumulating  dependencies on ontologies of presence/absence that do precede symbolic truth-valued discourse, but make our philosophical underpinnings both bloated and brittle.

This, of course, has to do with the fact that normality (I’m tempted to coin “nomality”, but resist) in politics has been restored. Whatever happens next in Brasília is unlikely to be interesting.

What will be the next anomaly we ride on?



asemic horizon continuously hesitates to comment on salient, event-like anomalies because it cultivates a particular conceit called “theory”. The intellectual import of this conceit is that, in theoretical work, an all-consuming effort is placed on making sense of salient structure-like anomalies. The philosophical import of this all-consuming effort is that systems thinking implies there is a single structural anomaly — that salient structure-like anomalies must always/continually reproduce themselves in a system-like anomalous homeostasis.

At this point, the patient reader should react with skeptical reflexes: how can something that is so stable and wide-encompassing be characterized as an anomaly?

Baudrillard famously says that “the secret of theory is that truth does not exist” just as “the secret of gambling is that money does not exist”. Surely enough, there is money, but anomalously so — which is to say, without nomos, without law. Under “ambient conditions of gambling” money is fully disconnected — not only from the wide system of value that makes it money-like, but also from local continuity laws. In gambling, money is savage.


A common objection (at least from the nonrandom input I occasionally get from readers) to asemic horizon’s signature approach to temporality is that physical simultaneity is a thing — it appears in the fundamental ontology of nature with meaning and consequence. This is very true, but not a substantial objection: we’re citizens of physics by force of metaphysical necessity, but also citizens of Uruk and economic systems and human systems of many sorts.

Classical physics (and note that the relevance of post-classical physical theories is contingent on them reproducing certain classical structures, at least at mesoscales) is the theory of phase spaces, and in the setting with the most metaphysical weight, spaces in which phase flows are reversible. This is terrible! Of course, since physicists are among the smartest apes the species has bred, they’ve managed to proliferate “arrows of time” in mathematics-drenched models of increasing abstraction and unintuitiveness. Which is to say: physics gambles with abstraction and occasionally makes bank, reaches empirical validity and even woos our metaphysical hearts with tales of worlds utterly unlike human experience. We should have great reverence for the sheer cleverness and power of these models — but not mistake them for theories of the world.

On the contrary, the pure irony of the topsy-turvyness worlds of post-classical (and especially quantum-based) physics trying to restore the nomos should be evident from the vantage point of our phenomenal, lived-in experience. Science cannot “drain the swamp” of anomaly. And heavens know that we are drowning in anomaly.


If physics was the enemy of theory, it would be an extremely — almost to the point of indeterminate might — powerful foe. But theory does not aim nor dare to challenge it. Science lives in the realm of the Symbolic, after all — its goal is not to break through the order of the Real (much like the gambler’s goal is not to produce a sustainable cashflow), but rather to make sense of the natural world. Theory dwells on the Symbolic order as well, but in mad, anomalous fashion, alternating listlessness and euphoria. Theory is grand conceit: it proliferates entities and arguments founded on phantom hypotheticals in hopes of breaking free — on sucking the marrow of the Real, feverishly gambling episteme to win big. Contrary to Baudrillard, the secret of theory is that truth exists, but it does not exist in theory.

Theory is a bet on the glitch. It obsesses over structural anomaly because of the widespread perception that most of the world is anomalous. Most of real temporality is clicky tempo xor weather/uncertainty/kairos. Most of the agency in the world is contingent on axiologies over axiologies over axiologies over… Most meaning is in seduction and withdrawn enjoyment. Most communication happens through orchestration of extradiegetic technologies to make diegesis happens. Most of salvation and deliverance is third-order soteriology. And if killing is sex, it is so due to a paradox known as physique du rôle.

At some point, we should find ourselves gambling (metaphorically) with usefully complex market derivatives rather than crappy polymer-acryllic roulette in ersatz river-boat casinos. Then hedging operations. Then whatever comes on top of that. Eventually, general axiology.


So what of the coronavirus disease of 2019/20? It surely appears to be a glitch — while at the same time being clearly a cog in the machine, a region of the system, Dasein borelians and all that bebop. This is, again, because much of the system is glitchy. You’re sitting at a computer right now: notice how uneven its temporality, how unknowable in its automatic orchestration of archeological piles of cruft. Software engineering assumes glitchiness and occupies itself with mitigation. Interact mindfully with your computer, notice its near-organic unreliability, its incorrectness. The motto of our era is that “software is eating the world”: this means glitches are eating the world. 

Search your hearts. Or ask any software engineer.

The core anomaly of computers is that they’re actually useful. The core anomaly of the 2020 coronavirus disease is that its mostly harmless — while also being deadly almost at random. The mot du jour, “asymptomatic carrier”, expresses this incredible paradox: being sick — and contributing to the systemic illness — while not being sick at all. And this is a terrible glitch, one that careens us to a full-blown once-every-five-generations meltdown in the span of three weeks.

Theory is not particularly helpful in dealing with this particular anomaly. Tools (PCR testing) have been developed by science, but they’re being used incorrectly — testing the known-sick instead of random sampling the population to actually know what the hell is going on. At a higher level of axiology abstraction this might actually be thinkable — but the goal of theory is to shoot meteorically toward ultimate abstraction to deal with ultimate anomaly — in warfare, in chrematistics, in wisdom — hell, in seducing women, if that’s really what consumes you (it appears to be a common theme with my readers).

But we have to assume the anomaly.

37+ layers


Once in a while, we have to start again from the top. If the Situation is indeed a polyrhytmic pattern of clicking, it makes sense that we skitter every so often from its groove and have to go five and four and three and two and hum to get back on track. And so we have, a handful of times already. But each reset has always led to one or two of the following: an explainer of the technical terminology and/or a reclaiming of the relevance of theory (meaning the theory of the theory of … the theory of generic structure).

Most recently, Tom from Telegram has placed a meaningful challenge on all of this. To be more precise: Tom has challenged my “theory discourse”, as manifested outside these writings — roughly, the pragmatics on top of which theory validates itself even as it proffers to be distanced and even disconnected from real worlds of meaning and value. Even further in precision: Tom challenges me to be nontrivial. And as much as we have gone back and forth on the concept of triviality (as much as I believe to have successfully “destabilized it”, identified with known difficult problems and shown to be as-of-yet-inoperable), the challenge itself stands on its own legs.

Back when asemic horizon was getting started, I used to make a lot of the fact that I wrote multiple drafts that never converged into something publishable. This was in part to apologize for the quality of the text — “I know this is terrible but it’s truly the best I’ve got right now”; but the quality of the text was not only due to being rusty in a foreign language, but also to the general awkwardness of trying to comment on suspicious political matters in such a way that “more light than heat” came out. This changed with the sharp theoretical turn inaugurated with “…Kropotkin“. Thereafter drafts reached the dignity of the “Publish” button through their verve and provocativeness or died by being “technical” and “boring”. The general problem of triviality therefore collides (which is to say, coincides at a point of shock) with the narrower problem of technical theory.

Namely: that technical theory is, at best, trivial (albeit plagued with leaps of reasoning in the general case). In the opposite limit, theory is made of pure verve.


{0,1} are distinct atoms. Maybe distinct atoms exist, maybe they don’t. But this openness to possibility is in bijection with the distinct atoms: that is, we can map “0” with “distinction atoms exist” and “1” with “they don’t”. Why does the very radical doubt of distinctness in claimable equivalence with distinctness? Because the claimable equivalence can, itself, be mapped to one of the distinct atoms in such a way that “0” can be mapped with “this doubt is sound” and “1” to “this doubt is nonsense”. In this way doubt can be indefinitely radicalized at a relatively low cost: crunch the numbers and behold: 37 entire layers of the Veil of Maya fit in a SD card the size of your smallest fingernail. The cost-benefit analysis therefore pans out: we can assume distinctness in full confidence that an indefinitely large number of levels of radical doubt about distinctness can be transformed into distinctness.

Note that distinctness is also (and according to some, fundamentally) a way of talking about nondistinctness. Maybe A, B, C,… are apparent distinctions in the world, and for each pair the propositions “AB are distinct”/”are not distinct” span a distinction. The ultimate lesson of the Heart Sutra in this light is: as we work through the Dharma of nondistinctness we find the Dharma itself to be nondistinct, at which point radical transience emerges as the nondistinctness of nondistinctness — at the moment where you’re preparing yourself to evaluate the distinctness-value of that object of final desire, it reveals itself not to be an object, but a process, a differential equation, always gone, gone beyond the great beyond.

Contrariwise, if everything is held to be distinct and inordinately specific, then there is no pair of distinctive propositions “everything is distinct”/”nondistinct”. Indefinite distinctness either collapses or forces us to reconsider the value of the concept “distinctness”. But as noted, we can reconsider that until the boars rule over Barcelona.


Pulling distinctness from an uninspectable box of speculative toys is a trivial maneuver. But outmaneuvering distinctness is cost-prohibitive — at current exponents, not even Moore’s law can save us from having to consider some things to be distinct and some others not. To paraphrase someone who said this about capitalism, it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of distinctness. But I say this not to praise distinctness, but to ventilate (to give wind, and therefore the material ability for it to sound itself) the possibility of seriously considering the end of the world.

This is the dharma of systems theory: the system could fail to continuously reproduce its ongoing outcome — why doesn’t it? Why isn’t the planet crushed by its own gravity, society not radically disturbed by the vagaries of social systems (not to the point of indefinite and aimless revolution, anyhow), pension funds not crashing given a horizon of negative real interest rates? There must be a mechanism; and radically, a mechanism that cannot be meaningfully distinguished (set in a bijection with the atoms {0,1}) from the outcome itself. Therefore systems are utterly nondistinct, and any attempt at reintroducing distinction incurs the vagaries of mereology, roughly meaning the fundamental uncertainty that prevents us from peering into the system from the outside, analyzing its circuits, computing Fiedler numbers and disconnecting wires here and there to specify subsystems while simultaneously spanning para-systems of counterfactuals that account for the fact that we have messed with the circuits in first place.

It would nevertheless appear — from the way experts and authorities speak — that our ability to analyze end-of-the-world scenarios is founded in precisely that: split the thing-of-the-world into subcircuits and give each to a specialist, an expert. Here, too, a kind of distinctness is posited, but its tree of radical skepticisms grows fast unwieldy. Sure, “experts can hack it” and “the sum of experts can’t span the sum-system” are distinct propositions in bijection etc. but skepticism about this unfolds to “non-experts can/can’t make judgements on what experts can do”. To doubt that this distinction requires doubting the expert/non-expert distinction. And what next? To doubt the idea that distinctions like expert/non-expert can be made? At this point we’re at the edge of nondistinctiveness again. Bodhi svaha!


If an expert announces a rising pandemic in an empty forest, what’s its R0 number?

Consider the candidate-distinction: viroepidemiologists are either doing a great job (implicit context: the COVID-19 scare/death flu) or it’s not. I am able to meaningfully doubt it’s a distinction at all — the boundaries of what is and isn’t “a great job” are left undefined, and even if a council of all-powerful kings had arrived at global target-metrics, evaluating the claim requires having done the whole systems-splitting mambo, which we can reasonably doubt. It’s a trap! We’ve even posited kings as axiology-avatars (there are none out there) and are still left with serious, fundamental doubts.

Does this mean that the whole of the system must be in the axiology (the evaluating machine)? No, but one’s theory of how the system works and how it can be valuably be fiddled with to achieve valuable goals, undoubtedly yes. We had defined axiology from the outset to be both a domain of valuable goals (left-axiology) and a set of actions that are, themselves, valuable. But this was claimed assuming (in deferred form — remember that a loan is the theory of being able to pay it back) some kind of mereological waterworks which, in the general setting of systems theory, appears to be non-operational at best — possibly ill-defined entirely.

Much of what appears to be a trivial proliferation of concepts and loosely-defined technical jargon has to do with attempting to circle around this problem and mount a prolonged siege. Our radical discussion of temporality, for example, tries to skin the cat of system-dissection in what appears to be fundamental phenomenological modalities: anything, we claim, that can be said to happen, happens according to its own tempo, clicks of its own, in such a way that the pattern of clicking exhibits the iterative pattern of the Situation. On the contrary, the dharma of systems theory ultimately tells us — nothing “happens”, everything happens, the system itself whispers m’ilummino d’immenso.

It’s possibly easier to see this in action with diegesis, or salvation, etc. Belaboring the point that a rich environment (the ambient conditions and so on) of nondistinctness must be present for distinctions to be meaningfully (nontrivially) posited would be, well, trivial. This is already monotonous enough. In General Axiology, nondistinctness (a concept, or rather, the denial of one) will redeem us.

Guerra cultural


Praxis is at once the agitating mechanism and the key site of misosophy, the hatred of wisdom. Philosophy teaches, on the contrary, ambivalence and detachment. Contrary to philosophy, theory-in-the-world is of-praxis, specifically the praxis of deferral. Taking a loan is the theory of being able to pay it back at a later time. This deferral operator also binds (at least potentially) to the misosophical microaggression of making theoretical claims. Such is life: in practice, misosophic acts of theory are always everywhere, whether out of sophistry, droll self-absorption or plain hatred. Theory is very often captured by smaller-axiology praxial enterprises — ideologies, strategy consulting, hustling at large. 

Of course, when asemic horizon invokes this word — theory — it means what it means: theory is the theory of generic structure. The horizon implies a radical practice of deferral, one that continually threatens never to come back to the lower axiologies and instead just sail away indefinitely. That this horizon is asemic points (and this becomes natural and unsurprising with time) to a rejection of meaning even in the last instance. Unlike, say, Zizek’s marriage to communism-in-the-end, the theory of the theory of the theory … of generic structure merely points to structure, which is to say, to the abstract gesture of structural consistency. This is an abstract gesture because it corresponds to a systemic outcome of the indefinite complexity of theory. The gesture therefore runs the risk of saturating its misosophic potentials.

Still, the strangeness of this project should underscore the ethical import of the theory it pro/duces. Zizek is not personally completed by his own cleverness — his underlying struggle is to build new foundations for dialectical materialism so that communism might win. The ethical point of asemic horizon is rather more abstract: to overcome praxis by deferring it into a cascade of expanding axiologies until we get to… whatever general axiology holds. If old man Slavoj were to deign to engage us… it would be a short conversation, ending in a division by zero. Zizek is well above the standard leftist trope of highlighting our apparent contraleftist stance– but at any rate, there’s little for him to chew on — we have next to no stance on anything

Nota bene, we speculate about Zizek because we see him as thoughtful and open-minded. Anyone else would be excused for finding us boringasemic horizon is not about to be forcefully denounced by Vox, Paul Joseph Watson or the 8-Bit Guy. It is profoundly subversive, but not in a way that promptly bubbles up and makes it visible. Theory in our genre and mood holds its breath, dives into caves to find new clearings. If we eventually participate in a revolution, it will have been in the temporal mode of Happy the Clown — looking backwards as we throw the seeds of emancipatory unintelligibility. 


Guerra cultural appears to translate to “culture wars”, but that’s a category mistake. In the Culture Wars, “cultures” take on the syntactic role of a subject. Living unfolding cultures (take the U.S.: southern evangelical versus northeastern liberal) find themselves at axiological crossroads. The syntactic object of Culture Wars is the “issues” — abortion, forced bussing and so on (and so on) — at the center of these crossroads. GC works in reverse: loose semantic networks of pseudo-issues coalesce into contrived cultural camps which are then the object of controversy. Whomever or whatever wages <em>guerra cultural</em> sees these camps as politically-necessary “quilting points” (points de capiton) that arrest axiology drift. There’s an urgency to this: the drift devalues political actors — the dudes about which we decided to stop thinking circa “… Prince Kropotkin“. 

To some extent, the drift also devalues theory because it’s not theoretical< — it flows from the open-ended becoming of the world. Theory is, after all, a praxis of intelligibility, whether sincere or contrived, serious or droll, and there’s nothing intelligible about the inevitability of revolution — where, of course, “revolution” has pretty much been redefined to mean the unintelligible inevitability that looms over our attempts to arrest the drift.

Now, despite the fact that GC strives to uphold a variant of Jameson’s lemma (easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of Macunaíma) it has none of the “closure power” that Jameson and others attribute to capitalism. GC is an autoimmune response; in a perverse way, it fails to develop into a sensu stricto culture war because it emerges as a systemic response to the collapse of a prior cultural closure. 

There used to be progressives and conservatives. Popular singers (“artistas”, in português-Patropi) all had vague claims to persecution or resistance during the military dictatorship that was gradually phased out in the early 1980s. Circa 1990, conservatives were easier to find in Congress than in any given barbecue gathering. The only people that attempted to capitalize on the still-settling dust of the Berlin Wall were dusty communists in opposition to international developments — fools of an entirely different breed from what was coming.  

Then the purges started. Everyone who couldn’t fall in with the new politics crowd was somehow found to be “corrupt”; they shot down Collor de Mello, the first president to be elected since whenever, and subsequently the men who prosecuted were shot down in another corruption scandal. In this process, we were both taught that corruption is both a floating signifier (the word doesn’t mean anything — if everyone is “corrupted”, what does “non-corrupted” even look like?) and the root cause of all evil. After a while (and there are, obviously, many more ins and outs to this; the spread of evangelical Christianity continues to generate corrupt politicians in the old style), a new world was born — one in which CEPAL-trained dependency theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso could be counted as “right wing” by leftist and rightist imagination alike. 

Again, this is oversimplifying — you have to fit meu nome é Enéas in recent Brazilian history somehow — but it adds up to a decent representation of the extant balance of power circa 2000-2005. At that point there was no guerra cultural. For a while, there were even artistas (by which, we remind, is meant “best selling singers”) in top cabinet positions. The polar opposite of guerra cultural is nasal-reggae star Gilberto Gil in the Ministry for Culture.


A recent object lesson in GC that wandered onto my radar was the episode in which the as-of-2020 Minister for Culture (some non-artista idiot) was caught giving a speech that (quite literally) parallelled certain published speeches originally given by relevant Nazi official Goebbels. At face value, this looks like a particularly painful choice for political seppuku, but a little quick “12 Angry Men”-type reflection solves the puzzle: given all that we know of the general chaos in the Bolsonaro administration, the man was probably fed lines by a disgruntled underling. But what caught my attention wasn’t that someone in the more apparent-ideological sectors of the Bolsonaro government did something idiotic and self-destructive: it was the abhorrent development in which mass media zeroes in on the background music of the offending video instead. It’s Lohengrin, Wagner, Hitler’s “favorite composer”. 

Mounting pressure compounded by the evidence of German music, the culture minister gets fired directly by Jair Bolsonaro. It’s not like his public image can afford the impressions that he has Nazis running things. 

Is this satire? Are fish wet? Yes, and also that particularly Brazilian brand of yesno: Macunaíma.

At one point in this discourse-cycle, we’re even treated to B&W footage of Bayreuth. This man has Nazi overtones, specialists (Macunaíma) tell us — it’s in the minutiae of his supposé-non-macunaimique aesthetics. But no one seems to recall either that German culture as a whole was subject to extensive denazification by the occupying powers, and if the Lohengrin is something that was cleared, then the sincerity of the occupying powers is up for suspicion. Not that it matters to guerra cultural: someone serious might ask how is it that Nazi music is still in widespread circulation, but the marginal utility of attention to this issue quickly collapses — the seduction of Macunaíma (as that which delivers us from high culture and Nazis) can’t withstand extended thinking. 

Also: no one seems to remember Wagner’s quite overt anti-semitic theories, which precedes Hitlerism by nearly a century. After all, it’s not at all clear that Hitler personally had any particular feelings about Wagner — and by reductio to GC, there is nothing about the nazifascist tragedy that isn’t about the person and mustache of Adolf H. More to the point, the antisemitism of Wagner seems to run at slightly different theoretical lines from standard Nazi race ideology: at first, the German composer wants to target Meyerbeer, a personal and intellectual rival that enjoys success from richly staged populist melodrama. Wagner’s music is by constitution an entirely different enterprise; it boasts a highly advanced detonalism that’s often pointed as the opening salvo for the fully atonal music of the 20th century. An artistic genius, Wagner is however ill-equipped for the kind of theoretical attack he wants to deploy against triviality in music; his antisemitism is built out of existing, lazy tropes and for the remaining decades he seems to praise and support Jewish musicians and composers. The judgment of time almost unanimously falls to the idea that Wagner’s music has nothing of the misosophia of Wagnerian theories. This is further reiterated by denazification. 

Isn’t there anyone available that has the requisite cognitive skills to figure this stuff out? I might even volunteer — but I’m busy with theory.


We’re going to need this diagram again:


Culture wars are the continuation of cultural politics by other means. Guerra cultural is a reiteration of Macunaíma in new politics drag. Macunaíma’s yesno is the “denial of A-B that opposes B”; the political garb is the “denial of A that corrupts B”. It shouldn’t be difficult, from these observations, to solve for B. If we allow ourselves to indulge in synecdoche, we might even give Wagner a role as an avatar of B: civilization, intellectualized passion, truth-rain, all that good stuff. It’s harder to solve for A — it has an awful radioactive core in misosophia, but extends indefinitely into “General Praxis”. And in the absence of culture to moor cultural politics that enact cultural wars, there is nothing that can protect GC from the natural and sweet narcissistic idiocy in which we’re all (both within and without Macunaíma, in Rio and Warsaw) continuously almost drowning.

Which is why, of course, Bolsonaro retreats from it every single time

GC presents to the metapolitics of truth-rain a savage challenge whose extent perhaps only Jair fully understands. The soteriology in…and you shall know the Truth” has to do somehow with deliverance from the secondary antinomy. But it’s not like this can be obtained by Jair: Truth itself must “set you free”. It must therefore dissolve at once the reality of the primary antinomy and that of the tertium non datur. It must affirm a transcendental role for the primary antinomy, neither real nor nonreal, just there in sheer thereness. This is, of course, the very nature of truth-rain — radical thereness proven by radical thereness. But thereness-qua-thereness is nothing and does nothing. The existential core of truth-rain is sweet but tends to be crowded with philosopher sage types. How can truth-rain be affirmed through the base misosophia of real life?

That is perhaps the most general form of the problem we seek to defer. What we want is to have sufficient technology that high-grade theoretical development and social coordination start going hand-in-hand. What Jair wants to do now — while also struggling with GI tract trouble, undergoing surgery twice a year and raising a teenaged girl — we think it’s better achieved in General Axiology.

Epideictics III — New Histories


We have aimed (or, at the very least, repeatedly claimed) to sidestep philosophy. All along, our main directives — if one’s able to motion-blur the proliferation of so-called technical content — have been GENERALITY and GENERICITY; but in our theoretical mood that eschews argument for bald and torrential assertion, we’ve been using them in ways that break with the philosophical method. Namely, we made the grasp for genericity free, if somewhat dangerous: abstraction proliferates for the sake of abstraction, that is, for the sake of avoiding particulars. We’ve let the question of whether particular abstractions (and everything’s particular in its own level) are the “right ones” to its own dynamic development: the good chain of abstraction is expected to flip over (the famed “switcharoo”) at the point of ultimate voidness.

A decent interpretation of all this could say that we’ve made up the word “genericity” to describe a freestyle kind of “generality” that plays in the “theoretical mood” without making claims it cannot cash. But that’s not really it; without the sharp gener/ality/icity distinction the entire project collapses, because theory (despite all of its sex appeal and seduction) is all about operating in genericity; only a tiny percentage of its claims in generality.

I did what anyone would do in my position: retreat into my books and spill bullshit on Twitter to calm that urge to spill my seed (meaning: my ideas).

We ultimately come back to Deleuze 1968. It becomes clear that genericity is nothing but repetition, and generality is nothing but generality (but hark, Deleuze uses the word “generality” to mean “genericity”, and then words like “the virtual” and “intensive spatium” to mean “generality”). There’s a historical and ontological interplay between generality/difference and genericity/repetition; but this comes up in the wider project of founding generality/difference for itself and not as an outcome of repetition.

This is the clear source of my unease about philosophy in what pertains to theory and asemic horizon: having sewn Deleuze patches on my jackets and promised to name my firstborn “Gilles”, theory as presented here was always obscurely contra-Deleuzean. Deleuze 1968 stood as the eventual limit of philosophy; if we’re not traveling intergalactic space after Deleuze 1968, it’s our damn fault.

But we’ve never aspired to an anti-Deleuzeanism; theory had not had its proper beginning before Jair for the simple reason that explication of minutiae (and there are paragraphs in Deleuze 1968 that easily lead to entire careers) didn’t appeal to us, given that we had no career as a professional philosophers to be develop. Theory was obscurely meant to be orthogonal to philosophy (and therefore, Deleuze 1968) — to say nothing about reality itself but rather play with abstractions that let us (and this is always collective, you and me) cross levels of “meta”. This is also the method of mathematics, specially before its first break with physics: find the abstractions that let you reason in terms of abstractions.

What are the implications of this realization for theory? Much of what it says — truth-rain, interfacticity, axiologies, diegesis, chronicities, etc. — is sound in essence, but anything that wants to be powerful (e.g. to discover and enact general axiology) has to be in potentia; it has to arise from something else — from the becoming of something else — and has to account, as rigorous as the art really allows, for its own becomings. We’ve set up theory as a configuration of sites (and this is one of the dangers of Lacan as a model); we give people long maps, tell them to visit these sites. Yet the stray grasses and berries that spurt from th e empty ground tend to be regarded as nuisances, overflows of meaning in what hopes to develop as a perfect architecture of meaninglessness.

This, of course, is unsustainable. What’s more, in tends to suffocate concept-weeds that are swelling with reality, like saturation, in the name of Procrustean formulae like “sandwich dialectics”. What behooves us (yes, you and me) is nothing short of a bebop revolution in this respect.

A glossary


I wrote this for a friend.

This overview of asemic horizon’s technical terminology (known as “space opera” to earlier readers) follows an order that’s specific (such that it supports a series of contrasts and comparisons) but not special (in that no particular concept or term is anterior to others).

THEORY is the theory of generic structure. This is a recursive definition (the theory of the theory of the theory….) — and also defines GENERICITY as the remainder term in a truncated infinite series. Grosso modo, theory works by appealing to higher and higher orders of genericity: it therefore saves us the pain of working toward particulars. Before the Hölderlin story emerged, the motto of asemic horizon was “notes on structural affairs”. This remains a decent description of the functional role of theory throughout our project.

The SITUATION is the Whole Thing. Up to a certain point in time there were attempts to codify a “metaphysics of the situation”, something that still litters the earlier texts; by now, the word refers to a generic stand-in for metaphysics — a protocol — establishing certain desiderata for metaphysical theories. These desiderata are also not specified in technical terms, but revealed allusively across theory. Meta-level discussion of the Situation is often referred to as the “Heidegger story”; but this name implies fewer and weaker links to Heideggerian thinking proper than “Heidegger theory” would. Instead, this word pattern (the Tarski story, the Hölderlin story, etc) points to something that emerges as a presentation of theory rather than something that flows from theory itself.

The key “Heidegger story” feature of the Situation is INTERFACTICITY. Facticity is a sister word to contingency. My facticity is that about me which is fact (and mere fact); this glossary’s facticity is characterized by its linguistic infrastructure, the technology that supports it, the particular situations in which it emerged. One way of characterizing interfacticity is seeing it as the machinery of interactions between particular facticities, i.e. the infrastructure that supports the apparent merger of all facticities. But each facticity is also pure infrastructure: the interfacticity is the machinery of the world. A less clear (and possibly easier to grasp because of it) way to approach the subject is to start from intersubjectivity (maybe following Buber) and expand into the entire world through a kind of faux panpsychism — while at the same time removing agency and protagonism from everything in touches. There’s also the option of building from Heidegger 1927 directly, but that would seriously derail us into philosophical analyses no less important for theory, nor more critical than the water plumbing amenities that make writing theory possible at all.

If we continue to (somewhat embarassingly) stand by the name “Heidegger story” we might analogize interfacticity to the “Being” of “Being and Time”. Thus we sometimes decorate references to the Situation or situations with timely terms like “ongoing” or even “actual ongoing” (which is to say, taking place in a time structure that has already been actualized and produced). This doesn’t imply that the Situation is equipped with a global timeliness — despite the empirically-supported existence of something that flows at the rate of 1 second per second, simple phenomenological examination tells us that all that we now call infrastructure (electrical currents, currency speculators, geological folding, the wind in your hair) to take place in idiosyncratic TEMPO structures, not flowing but CLICKING. A vague, luminiferous awareness of interfacticity can then be developed by documenting (for the next few seconds in which you look away from this text) the polyrhytmic interplay of clicking tempos.

More generally, interfacticity (and, therefore, the Situation) is fundamentally de-presented. By this we mean: like infrastructure in the classical sense, interfacticity is fundamentally invisible (until something breaks down). In contrast, a SCENARIO is fundamentally presented; in the generic case it is PRODUCED (a technical term: to produce is to make appear) by presentations as disparate as ideologies, narratives, lecherous fantasies, theoretical claims. The infrastructure that supports a scenario is known as DIEGESIS (a term appropriated wholesale from film theory); we’re aware of it because it so often chokes or breaks down, at times even on purpose. Diegesis is necessarily supported by a dizzying array of self-effacing technologies. This machinery produces, as a free bonus, a dialectics of storytelling tool/story being told that might become important as we try to place agency-presentations in or out of the diegesis.

Diegesis also gives us a method and system for appropriating bits and pieces of Lacan (genericized into a theory of reflexive structures equipped with a mirror stage); we can explain more accurately and succintly that interfacticity is de-presented by hanging the Situation on the order of the Real and scenarios on the order of the Symbolic. The major task of social theory then becomes to produce (gentle reminder: to make appear) a genericized Imaginary in the EC-STATIC (that stands beside themselves) scenarios that engage the lecherous desires, intellectual curiosity, political motivation (cue Zizek voice sample: and so on, and so on) that push people, these particulars we try to avoid, into engaging with AXIOLOGIES — and that may push them, in the limit, to engage with GENERAL AXIOLOGY.

Simply put, general axiology is the largest possible axiology. An axiology (classical ones include aesthetics, ethics, economics, etc) is a theory of what is valuable and how to valuably obtain it. Axiological thinking enables us to abstract away human action entirely and operate at the level of governing dynamics. The axiology-centric theory of asemic horizon is therefore said to be APRAXIC. It’s not concerned with particular events taking place in the world, but with the structure (axiological, diegetic, interfacticitous) that enables arbitrary/generic action. Being a full axiology, arriving at general axiology also implies a theory of how to valuably obtain everything valued by general axiology — something we call the get-rich quick scheme.

General axiology is the main story of theory — the praxic program that balances the apraxic character of theory is that general axiology may cease to be mere story and metastasizes over the Situation. There is some significant methodological irony here: theory goes through effort and anxiety to remain decentered, but suddenly acquires a North Star, an asymptotic utopia. It’s furthermore ironic, given the standoff-ish attitude of asemic horizon toward metaphysics, that this centerpiece comes to be coated in a kind of quasi-religious pomp. Indeed at some point a major story was the eschatology — how a limit point of total genericity was to flip over (a “switcharoo”) to total generality; but this should be considered deprecated by now; the core texts have been retired but some references may survive.

Talking about eschatology was fun, but it didn’t jive with our expanded awareness of time. The coming of general axiology was to come in the future, but we were fully unable to gain systematic awareness about clicking in the future. The future does not hang in tempo — it flows at 1 second per second, we’re told, but it’s made of contingency, not event. An interesting collision helps us here: in many languages, from ancient Greek to modern Romance languages, the words for “weather” and “time” are the same. The Greek word is KAIROS; because naval battles were such a core exemplar of contingency for ancient Greeks, it came to signify a kind of time related to opportuneness for action — finally, metaphysicians were caught dichotomizing CHRONOS (the 1 second per second thing) and kairos.

One might observe, finally, that time-chronos is useful in human affairs because it approximates tempo in reasonably regular scenarios: rathen than record particular raindrops orchestrating a downpour, you can measure an aggregate quantity of rain in an aggregate time interval and react accordingly. Search your hearts, you know this to be true: the use of time-chronos in, say, applied science and engineering, has nothing to do with the eventual discovery of an “arrow of time” by abstract physicists. Worse yet, the use of flowing time in practical social affairs is a weird appeal to quantitative science where in reality social convention dictates an ambient tempo (seven days a week, only five of which are good for trading).

This discovery of ambient tempo brings us finally to the initial insight that bought me (the interplay of “I” and “we” over the course of the texts is important; this is me now, a writer) a way out from uselessly trying to discuss particulars — something that’s extremely inefficient given my limited time for this project — and into “structural affairs”: the AMBIENT CONDITIONS OF TRUTH. This is a concept that superficially may seem to appeal to consensus and social construction, but in actuality tries to refer to a standard of authenticity and risk. Usages of “ambient conditions” (such as ambient tempo) have since multiplied, and “ambient conditions of truth” has been given the nickname of TRUTH-RAIN. By analogy, this latter synonym explains its praxic consequences: truth is not an object of epistemology, but an actually ongoing condition to which one might expose oneself (soaking wet in the rain) or take shelter from. This came from Jair Messias Bolsonaro’s campaign slogan, apparently taken from the Christian bible: … and you shall know Truth, and Truth shall save you.

This was the original Bolsonaro crisis: having entered the postmodern condition on November 15th 1889, Brazil wasn’t quite sure what to make of this — the Truth. Not surprisingly, then, Jair’s strongest supporters were Christian evangelicals — people trying to live in a community of Truth — while his hardest detractors were those committed to social-constructionist fads and allergic to the Truth. It should be clear, by the po-mo “Continental-flavored” style of these collected texts, that I’m much more similar to the latter. But they’re wrong: they’ve taken shelter from the ambient conditions of truth when the whole thing is right in front of their eyes: not Christian religion but the abject failure of pink-tide South American leftist governments in doing whatever they thought it was worth doing, and worse yet, the abject failure of their theories of Brazil. Even a year later, when the euphoria has died down and Jair is already imbricated in the usual presidentialist bullshit, it’s still out there, in the air, for anyone who cares to step outside and breathe it.

The historical development of theory flows from this problem. The “Heidegger story” (interfacticity, in more modern terms) developed from the problem of giving sense to these mass nouns (ambient, Brazil, left, right and-so-on-and-so-on); axiologies from the unwillingness to deal with this and that person or event directly, but wanting to speak from truth-rain. Tempo to give leeway to the indefinite complexity of the world, scenarios to think of generic storytelling (not just “narratives” — everything to which diegesis and its dialectics applies). There’s more — the Hölderlin story, which complicates  “salvation”, physique du rôle, sandwich dialectics… But I think this has covered the basics, or at least the basics I could linearize as a narrative.